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The Third Criterion:
Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard
Against Partisan Gerrymandering
Daniel D. Polsbyt and Robert D. Poppertt
The health of democracies, of whatever type and range, depends on a wretched
technical detail-electoral procedure. All the rest is secondary.'
In the aftermath of the decennial census, reapportionment and its wayward
stepchild gerrymandering have again become topics of the hour. In 1991 or
1992, based on the new census, state legislatures will establish new boundaries
for congressional and state legislative districts. 2 In order to conform to the
constitutional mandate that districts have equal populations 3-"one person, one
vote" 4-states will have to redraw district lines to account for population shifts
that have accumulated over the past ten years. Yet reapportionment, made
necessary by fidelity to democratic principles, also will bring with it gerryman-
dering. Gerrymandering, broadly speaking, is any manipulation of district lines
for partisan purposes. 5 There are different varieties of gerrymandering, includ-
ing racial gerrymandering, 6 remedial racial gerrymandering, 7 and collusive
bipartisan gerrymandering. 8 Partisan gerrymandering, the most common kind
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Newman, Menachim Speigel, and the participants in the University of Pennsylvania Law School workshop;
Robert Bennett, Robert Burns, Mayer Freed, Mark Grady, David Haddock, Gary Lawson, and Victor
Rosenblum of the Northwestern law faculty; John F. Beukema of the Minnesota Bar; Bruce Cain of the
University of California political science faculty; and Brendan Duffy of Raymond Marketing, Inc. As
always, the conventional absolutions apply.
1. JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 158 (1932).
2. Under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, state legislatures exercise the districting power subject
to supervening congressional regulation.
3. The constitutional basis for this requirement is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment for state elections, or, in the case of federal elections, Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution,
which provides that representatives shall be elected by "the people." See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (state legislatures); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (federal districts).
4. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963); see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558.
5. See, e.g., Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A
Remaining Obstacle in the Questfor Fair and Effective Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 277, 278-280.
6. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
7. Race-conscious line-drawing is one of the remedies available under the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988); see United Jewish Org. of Williamsburg v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
8. See e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (upholding bipartisan gerrymandering accord
between Democratic and Republican members of Connecticut's legislature). Other kinds of districts,
including school, hospital, tax or judicial districts, also can be gerrymandered.
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and the subject of this paper, is undertaken by the political party in control of
a state legislature to help itself and injure its competitor.
It should not be surprising that redistricting is the occasion for so much
gamey partisan brawling, for in the districting game legislators are fighting
for their own political lives and that of their party, just as surely as in an
election campaign, but with more durable results. Depending on how district
lines are drawn, a party with only a minority of the popular vote can assert
control over a majority of seats in the state assembly and over its state's
delegation to the national House of Representatives. More typically, a party
that enjoys only a small majority in popular support over its principal competi-
tor will, through its control of the districting process, translate this popular
edge into preemptive institutional dominance.
Potential remedies for gerrymandering, as Bernard Grofman has pointed
out, come in two varieties: political and formal.9 A political remedy, for
example, might require that a redistricting plan satisfy a panel of bipartisan
commissioners, or that it be adopted by a supermajority of the legislature. The
remedy we propose is formal. In addition to adhering to criteria which mandate
that representational districts be composed of contiguous territories and have
equal populations, we suggest that those who define district boundaries must
also be required to respect a third criterion, the constraint of compactness.
Without the ability to distend district lines so as to include or exclude
blocks of voters whose political loyalties are known, it is not practically
possible to gerrymander. The diagnostic mark of the gerrymander is the
noncompact district. Anyone who eyeballs a few legislative district maps
quickly will learn to recognize gerrymanders, although admittedly with imper-
fect accuracy. But one need not rely on seat-of-the-pants reckoning to find the
sort of noncompactness that implies gerrymandering. A number of mathemati-
cal measures of compactness exist, some of which are no more difficult to
apply than the "one person, one vote" standard of Reynolds v. Sims.1 o These
measurements are useful because they correspond closely to a mapmaker's
practical ability to gerrymander districts. One of these compactness measures,
as we show in part III.D, is the best way to measure the kind of non-com-
pactness that is required for a workable gerrymander.
9. Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REv. 77,
79, 98-99 (1985).
10. 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
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I. GERRYMANDERING AND POLITICS
At the time of Elbridge Gerry, the eponymous gerrymanderer," and for
almost 200 years until Baker v. Carr," abusive partisan districting was a
relatively simple matter because there was no constitutional requirement that
districts be equinumerous. 13 Malapportionment was so powerful a tool for
diluting the opposition's votes that partisans needed no other.' 4
With the advent of "one person, one vote" and periodic reapportionment,
the focus of partisan districting changed. Creative gerrymandering now has
replaced the older strategy of malapportionment through legislative inaction.
Although districts must be equal in population, they need not have any particu-
lar shape or character, and they still may be manipulated to suit partisan needs.
Happily for partisans, the apportionment revolution coincided with technical
innovations in computers and in market research that made modern gerry-
mandering both easy and effective.' 5 Professional advice on effective gerry-
mandering is now a staple of the political consulting business. 6
The techniques for gerrymandering are simple and widely understood. In
single-member districts, only one legislator can win an election. Any support
beyond fifty-percent-plus-one is therefore superfluous, or, from the party's
point of view, "wasted." The partisan mapmaker seeks to draw lines which
concentrate the opposition's electoral support in just a few districts (called
"packing" or "stacking"), while at the same time creating many more districts
11. ELMER GRFFrrH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 19 (1907).
12. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Baker established the justiciability of constitutional challenges to malappor-
tioned districts.
13. Until 2 U.S.C. § 2a was amended in 1929, there was a statutory requirement that districts be equal
in population and be compact, but both requirements were routinely ignored. See RicHARD CORTNER, THE
APPORTIONMENT CASES 15 n.32 (1970); see also, Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 551, 555 (1946).
Since 1929, no equivalent statutory provision has been on the books.
14. See infra part III.A.
15. Gerrymandering software for desktop computers increases in power and sophistication almost by
the month, with correlative augmentations in the capabilities of those with the political authority to draw
district boundaries. See Anderson & Dahlstrom, Technological Gerrymandering, 22 URBAN LAWYER 59,
73-76 (1990); William E. Schmidt, New Age of Gerrymandering: Political Magic by Computer?, N.Y.
TIMEs, January 10, 1989 at Al; Mitch Betts, Gerrymandering Made Easy in 1990, COMPUTERWORLD,
Aug. 28, 1989, at 1. The generation of computers which drew the gerrymanders of the 1980s are almost
certainly obsolete. Now, for example, there is the Topographical Integration Geographic Encoding and
Referencing (TIGER), the U.S. Census Bureau's "new, high-tech map of America ... [that] means that
anyone can quite cheaply buy a detailed computerized map of any state-accurate down to street lev-
el-loaded with demographic data. Combined with other new technology this means that almost anyone
will be able to draw their own political maps." See Drawing Salamanders, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1990, at
26, 30.
16. See, e.g., David Anderson, Note, When Restraint Requires Activism: Partisan Gerrymandering
and the Status Quo Ante, 42 STANFORD L. REV. 1549, 1557 (1990) ("[In 1981 in Indiana, the] Republican
State Committee enlisted Market Opinion Research, Inc., a Michigan market research firm, to assist in
the creation of a Republican gerrymander. The Committee housed the computer equipment in its headquar-
ters and paid $250,000 to Market Opinion Research for their services .... Computer systems to assist
in redistricting first appeared in the mid-1960s. By 1971 ...state party organizations used computers
extensively. These systems were archaic by today's standards.").
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where his own party commands a smaller, but still safe, majority ("crack-
ing").17 The net result is that many more of the opposition party's supporters
have their votes squandered by being thrown into contrived landslides. The
gerrymandering party can thus win more seats in proportion to its electoral
support than it would if the district lines were drawn without regard for
partisan considerations.
In this section we show how gerrymandering is a real danger, an injury
to the practice of constitutional democracy. As part of this project, we examine
whether gerrymandering as an illicit activity really exists apart from the
legitimate give-and-take of partisan politics. In the process, we are led to a
definition of the intent to gerrymander.
A. Gerrymandering and Political Theory
Gerrymandering inflicts harm on democratic institutions, although this harm
is easier to characterize than to prove. For example, while it is reasonable to
suggest that constituents are not accurately represented by a gerrymandered
legislature, those who believe this assertion (we include ourselves) must take
it on faith, for we know of no way to prove it. Indeed, there is no generally
accepted theory of how a legislature is supposed to reflect its constituents'
interests and values.18
There are better ways, however, to frame the political-theoretical argument
against gerrymandering. Gerrymandering violates the American constitutional
tradition by conceding to legislatures a power of self-selection. Self-constitutive
legislatures, or self-constitutive governing institutions of any kind, make no
sense under a Constitution whose most arresting innovation was the dispersion
of power. Legislatures are legislatures not because they say they are (any
"body" can make that claim) but because a constitution says they are. 9 To
be sure, there is nothing specific in the Constitution that forbids gerrymander-
ing, any more than there is specific language that forbids the excessive, unfair,
or abusive exercise of any delegated power, but the very idea of democracy
17. "Cracking" somewhat obscurely refers to the fact the opposition's support has been ineffectually
divided.
18. There is not even agreement as to how a legislator is supposed to "represent" the people-as a
"delegate," a "trustee," an "agent," or something else. Words like "portraying," "signifying," "mirroring,"
or "making present" have been applied to the ineffable idea of representation. See B.J. Diggs, Practical
Representation, in REPRESENTATION 28 (Pennock & Chapman eds., 1968); J. Roland Pennock, Political
Representation:An Overview, in REPRESENTATION, supra, 3, 8, 27; Charles L. Black, Jr., Representation
in Law and Equity, in REPRESENTATION, supra, 131, 140.
19. Cf. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, §§ 212, 216 (J.M. Dont & Sons 1924)
(discussing executive interference with composition of legislature) ("The constitution of the legislative is
the first and fundamental act of the society . . . without which no one man, or number of men, amongst
them can have authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest .... l1117 others than those whom
the society hath authorised thereunto do choose, or in another way than what the society hath prescribed,
those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people.").
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that is embedded in the Constitution certainly forbids legislatures from insulat-
ing themselves from the popular will." The members of a partially
self-constituted legislature depend to a degree upon one another rather than
upon their constituents for their tenure in office. Whatever "representation"
means, it cannot possibly mean that.
Thus Martin Shapiro has aptly described gerrymandering as a "pathology
of democracy."2 Gerrymandering introduces a chronic, self-perpetuating
skew into the business of popular representation, no matter how the term is
defined. A perversion of democratic procedure, the problem resists correction
by democratic means.22 Those in control of the districting process can gerry-
mander the opposition into electoral irrelevance.' In the final analysis, then,
"the pathology of democracy problem is so overwhelming that-for most
Americans of good will, including those who happen to be judges-it over-
20. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), held that the clause, "chosen . . . by the People," of
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution requires federal congressional districts to conform to the equal
population standard. The dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan has persuaded scholars that the historical basis
for this interpretation is largely absent. See, e.g., Carl Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person,
One Vote - One Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5. It is typically suggested that the Fourteenth
Amendment provides more appropriate grounds for the standard. Id. The Wesberry argument, however,
that malapportionment deprives "the People" of the power to constitute the legislature is more to the point,
and applies equally to gerrymandering.
21. Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Fairness, and the Supreme Cour, 33 UCLA L. REV. 227, 239
(1985).
22. It has long been recognized that anti-democratic practice can effectively poison democratic
institutions and prevent reform. Justice Clark, concurring in Baker v. Carr, wrote that he would "not
consider intervention by this Court into so delicate a field if there were any other relief available to the
people of Tennessee" by which they could effect a reapportionment of their legislature. 369 U.S. 186, 259
(1962). "The majority of the voters [in Tennessee] have been caught up in a legislative straitjacket....
[Tlhe legislative policy has riveted the present seats in the Assembly to their respective constituencies, and
by the votes of their incumbents a reapportionment of any kind is prevented. The people have been rebuffed
at the hands of the Assembly; they have tried the constitutional convention route, but since the call must
originate in the Assembly it, too, has been fruitless." Id. at 259. See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
570 (1964) (lack of available political remedy results in "minority stranglehold on the State Legislature");
WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 652 (1964) (call for constitutional convention in New York must pass
both houses and even if convened, delegates would be sent from current districts); Maryland Committee
v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 669 (1964) ("Although over 10 reapportionment bills were introduced into the
General Assembly between 1951 and 1960, all failed to pass because of opposition by legislators from the
less populous counties."); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 689 (1964) (no adequate political remedy); Roman
v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 706 (1964) (no adequate political or state constitutional remedy).
The discussion in the text pertains to state legislatures, which must district themselves. The same
considerations apply where state legislatures create federal congressional districts. Under Article I, Section
4 of the Constitution, Congress has the power to constitute itself, even if indirectly, by regulating the
manner in which state legislatures draw congressional districts. One would expect Congress to forego this
prerogative as long as state legislatures behave themselves and discomfit few incumbents.
23. Even the members of the minority opposition who make it to the legislature have a perverse
incentive to do nothing about the current gerrymander, because they typically reside in the "packed"
districts; they are the beneficiaries of those carefully constructed supermajorities which form half of the
gerrymander equation. They well might think twice about the suggestion that they agree to a smaller margin
of victory "for the good of the party."
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comes judicial role and capacity problems. Gerrymandering is a bad, bad
thing. And there is nobody around to fix it except the courts."24
Effective gerrymandering is a special threat to the Madisonian version of
constitutional democracy because of the way it affects the system of
single-member district representation. The strategies for electoral success in
single-member districts are quite different from those that apply to multi-
member districts. In a single-member district, the dominant strategy is to
acquire the support of a majority of voters, those who cluster near the "mid-
dle" of the political spectrum. Multi-member districts, where a candidate can
win by coming in second or fifth or twenty-fifth, depending on how many
candidates may be elected from the district, allow the election of candidates
whose views are on the fringe, even the extreme fringe of the electorate. The
characteristic of single-member districts that gerrymandering seeks to defeat
is the tendency of such districts to "center" the political debate.
In single-member districts, political factions that wish to be politically
influential have an incentive to compromise their differences. Robert A. Dahl
has summarized the Madisonian argument:
If a faction consists of less than a majority, it can be controlled by the operation
of [what Madison called] "the republican principle" of voting in the legislative
body, i.e., the majority can vote down the minority... [while the] development
of [a] majority faction can be limited if the electorate is numerous, extended, and
diverse in interests.'
Generally, one-issue fanatics who do not move towards the political center will
tend to be ignored.26
In contrast, a multi-member system amplifies local differences. Factions
rather than coalitions will send representatives to the assembly, to struggle for
their factious enthusiasms undiluted by the need for compromise. The political
attitudes of the membership will have greater variance than a Madisonian
assembly, and a greater potential for fragmentation and paralysis because of
the wide gulf that will lie between the extremes.27 Voters in multi-member
districts have one advantage over their counterparts in single-member districts
in that they are more likely to have the opportunity to vote for a candidate
whose views, in priority and intensity, nearly approximate their own.
A single-member district system that is gerrymandered, however, possesses
the worst aspects of both Madisonian democracy and proportional representa-
tion. It is even less proportionally representative of the voters than an ordinary
24. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 251 (characterizing the view of those who support the justiciability of
gerrymandering claims).
25. ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 27 (1956); see also THE FEDERALIST Nos.
10, 51 (James Madison).
26. See Ferdinand A. Hermens, Representation and Proportional Representation, in CHOOSING AN
ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 16-17 (Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman eds. 1984).
27. See id.; see also Maurice Duverger, Which is the Best Electoral System? in CHOOSING AN
ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 32.
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single-member district system, which always contains a natural skew against
minorities.2" At the same time, the beneficiaries of gerrymanders, less needful
of forming local coalitions or making compromises to assure their success, are
also less needful of being near the political center of their districts. They are,
in brief, more likely to be ideologues.29 The district system has always been
something of a balancing act, seeking to afford minorities protection from the
domination by the majority that occurs under statewide electoral systems, while
also seeking to preserve the benefits of majority rule.30 Gerrymandering strips
minorities of the protections that districts were meant to provide.
Despite its apparent problems, gerrymandering has had defenders. Peter
Schuck, although not quite a friend of the practice, has suggested that gerry-
mandering in some of its aspects could actually benefit democracy because it
"reinforce[s] the majority party's capacity to govern alone, making it easier
to attribute responsibility for political acts," and thus furthers the goal of party
accountability. 3 ' Admittedly, governability and accountability are good things,
but they cannot be defended without reference to fair process. It is no defense
of rigged elections to say that at least they have decisive outcomes. Stuffing
ballot boxes, or enlisting squads of goons to intimidate voters, also reinforces
"the majority party's capacity to govern alone," and makes it "easier to attrib-
ute responsibility." Nor does it much advance the argument for gerrymander-
ing to argue, as Schuck does, that the practice is hard to do effectively and that
it may backfire.32 True enough-and equally true of stuffing ballot boxes and
28. See infra text accompanying note 52.
29. There is good evidence that the Founders valued the faction-diluting character of representation
by place. Rather than representation by wealth, by profession, or indeed by any other principle of
organization which would define in advance the kinds of interests that would be admitted to the game of
politics, the authors of the Constitution deliberately chose geographical representation. They believed that
this principle possessed a randomizing effect on the make-up of the voting public. Thus, for example, when
Hamilton argued that the "wealthy and the well-bornm"-a faction-would not come to dominate the
legislature through abuse of the voting process, he asked:
Are the wealthy and the well-born, as they are called, confined to particular spots in the several
States? Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them a common
place of residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are they, on the
contrary, scattered over the face of the country as avarice or chance may have happened to cast
their own lot or that of their predecessors?
THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 370-71 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). The gerrymanderer's art is to defeat this
randomizing effect by editing the list of factions with which it will later have to contend.
Writing to a friend in 1785 about his ideas for the Kentucky constitution, Madison stated that
representation "cannot be done otherwise than by geographical description." MARVIN MEYERS, THE MIND
OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 30 (1981). It would be
mindreading to attribute too much to this sentence if it were considered in isolation from the rest of
Madison's thought, but it is a further warranty that the basic constitutive problem of district making was
one that he considered important.
30. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130 (1986); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973).
31. Peter Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and the Judicial Regulation of
Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1361 (1987).
32. See, e.g., id. at 1341-45; Bruce E. Cain, Simple vs. Complex Criteria for Partisan Gerrymander-
ing: A Comment on Niemi and Grofnan, 33 UCLA L. REV. 213, 225-26 (1985); MICHAEL BARONE &
GRANT UIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1986 at 91; see also Davis, 478 U.S. at 152
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hiring goon squads, as Ferdinand Marcos and Anastazio Somosa found out to
their sorrow.
It is confusing to say both that gerrymandering may be a good thing, and
that, luckily, it is rarely successful, but if gerrymandering is a pathology of
democracy, either assertion is beside the point. Also spurious is the implication
that the practice of partisan gerrymandering is somehow "fair" because both
parties do it and thus, over time, its effects will wash.33 Democratic ballot
box stuffing in Chicago is not meaningfully cured by Republican ballot box
stuffing downstate. Ballot box stuffing is contrary to democracy, whether or
not it affects the outcome of this or that election and whether or not both
parties practice it. If gerrymandering is similar, then the remedy can hardly
be more gerrymandering.
Some commentators belittle the real-world impact of gerrymandering on
American politics,"4 but if gerrymandering is an antidemocratic practice it
should not matter that its impact is transient or cannot be firmly quantified.
To be sure, a gerrymander's impact rarely can be segregated from the pull of
countless other factors, such as personalities, local issues, current events,
incumbency effects, and media leanings, that sway-or supposedly
sway-elections.3" But this point cuts both ways. Gerrymanders may well be
more effective than we imagine. An effective gerrymander may discourage
minority-party voters from even going to the polls. Further, a majority party,
its power swollen by effective gerrymandering, controls legislative committee
chairs and committee agendas, which can be manipulated to amplify its elector-
al dominance. A candidate who wins one election because of gerrymandering
will thereafter enjoy the "non-gerrymander" benefits of incumbency and
enhanced name recognition.36 Thus, while gerrymanders as such may rapidly
decay because of the mobility of the population, the fruits of gerrymandering
may well decay much more slowly. Finally, if it successfully forces opposition
incumbents to run against one another in a newly merged district, a gerryman-
der may set off intra-party dissension that further debilitates the minority party
at the polls.
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). As the technology of gerrymandering becomes more powerful, however,
we assume that these well-known risks will diminish.
33. See, e.g., MICHAEL BARONE AND GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1984
at 68, 378, 994 (discussing California, Indiana and Pennsylvania).
34. See, e.g., Out of the Districting Thicket, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1983, at A16; BARONE &
UJIFUSA, supra note 33, at 74 (gerrymanders have little impact because effects "wear off" with time);
Norman J. Ornstein, Genesis of a Gerrymander, WALL ST.J., May 7, 1985 at 30 (disparities between votes
cast for, and seats won by Democrats in House of Representatives attributable to partisan voting patterns,
not gerrymandering).
35. This point is often made by those seeking to dismiss the impact of gerrymandering on politics.
See, e.g.. Schuck, supra note 31, at 1340; Ornstein, supra note 34.
36. See Warren Lee Kostroski, Party and Incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns
and Models, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1213 (1973); Robert S. Erikson, Research Note, The Advantage of
Incumbency in Congressional Elections, 3 POLITY 395 (Spring 1971).
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The question whether gerrymandering is good or bad democratic practice
simply cannot be avoided, either by invoking the possibility that gerrymander-
ing might not matter (because it also might) or by shifting the burden of proof
to its detractors to quantify its harm. If gerrymandering is a pathology of
democracy, polite electoral fraud, as we argue below, its friends must defend
it as a good thing.
B. Gerrymandering and Partisanship
Most scholars who have noticed the gerrymandering problem argue that
courts should not attempt to do anything about it. The arguments have two
basic themes, although authors often interweave elements of both. One ap-
proach holds that there is no judicial antidote for gerrymandering for the most
fundamental reason, namely that it has no independent existence, but is merely
a sore loser's epithet for a redistricting argument that he lost. Another ap-
proach concedes that gerrymandering exists and is a problematic activity, but
argues that the intent to gerrymander is indistinguishable from the intent to
obtain partisan political influence or power generally.
No one seriously doubts that gerrymandering, and plenty of it, has been
going on for years. Politicians most likely gerrymander whenever they can,
and they are often disarmingly unselfconscious about admitting it.37 They hire
the most clever consultants money can buy, who well understand the game they
are playing and the risks and rewards of playing it.38 The dispute over the
existence of gerrymandering is concerned with a deeper problem, which cannot
be dismissed without analysis. It is possible to characterize gerrymandering
as an optical illusion, something in the eye of the beholder that, upon deeper
37. The testimony given in Davis, for example, is fairly illustrative. "MR. SUSSMAN: 'What I would
like you to do here again is to give me whatever reasons were operative to your mind in maintaining or
creating... districts...' MR. DAILEY: 'Political.' MR. SUSSMAN: 'What were the political factors?'
MR. DAILEY: 'We wanted to save as many incumbent Republicans as possible.'" Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109, 116 n.5 (1986); and elsewhere: "As one Republican House member concisely put it, '[tihe
name of the game is to keep us in power.'" Id. at 177-78 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
The same unguarded candor was exhibited by the late Rep. Phil Burton, who masterminded the 1980
California redistricting and is generally conceded to be one of gerrymandering's modem masters. He
"publicly joked that his zig-zagging district lines were 'our contribution to modem art.' With respect to
California's newly drawn Fifth Congressional District, then represented by his brother, Burton stated, 'Oh,
it's gorgeous, it curls in and out like a snake.'" Frederick K. Lowell & Teresa A. Craigie, California's
Reapportionment Struggle: A Classic Clash Between Law and Politics, 2 J. L. & PoL. 245, 246 (1985)
(citations omitted). Burton considered his own behavior to be justified by offsetting Republican gerryman-
dering in places like Indiana. Id.
Rep. George Brown was one of the beneficiaries of Phil Burton's dexterity. In 1988, Brown told the
Wall Street Journal's Paul Gigot: "a good gerrymander 'is essential. [This district] is probably safe for
me for another two terms,'"-"just in time for another gerrymander in 1990," noted Gigot. "He then hopes
to redraw 'a new, smaller seat that will be safely Democratic.'" Paul A. Gigot, IncumbentforLife: I Came,
I Saw, 1 Gerrymandered, WALL ST.J., Nov. 4, 1988 at A14.
38. See supra note 16.
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appreciation, does not really exist. It is, on this argument, unrealistic to speak
of "fair" or "neutral" political ground rules. Such rules are never neutral; in
a hackneyed evocation, everything is politics. Thus Professor Michael Moore's
suggestion that gerrymandering may be like Gertrude Stein's Oakland: "there's
no there there." Judge Abner Mikva found a familiar way to encapsulate this
sort of skepticism when he said that gerrymandering is "somewhat like pornog-
raphy. You know it when you see it but it's awfully hard to define." 3" Just
as there are some liberated (or libertarian) souls who claim never to have seen
"pornography," there are people who claim never to have seen gerryman-
dering.
Robert Dixon once remarked that "all districting is gerrymandering."'
As he said elsewhere:
The key concept to grasp is that there are no "neutral" lines for legislative
districts. Whether the lines are drawn by a ninth-grade civics class, a board of
Ph.D.'s, or a computer, every line drawn aligns partisan and interest blocs in a
particular way different from the alignment resulting from putting the line in some
other place. 4'
It is not just that the choice of one districting plan over another is necessar-
ily partisan. Equally partisan are choices concerning districting methods or
criteria, because these always tell something about the choice between plans.
Every districting method helps someone at least to the extent of hurting
someone else. Because districting criteria are inevitably "non-neutral" in the
sense that someone will always benefit, it is naive at best to try to segregate
gerrymandering from other ways of drawing district lines.
Daniel Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg have taken this argument to its
logical extreme. "[T]here are no coherent public interest criteria," they say,
"for legislative districting independent of substantive conceptions of the public
interest, disputes about which constitute the very stuff of politics. "42 In other
words, every "neutral" criterion overtly or covertly imports a view about who
ought to exercise power. Any set of rules regarding any part of the conduct
of elections will necessarily dispose toward a particular set of winners and
losers.
It is mistaken to assert that a "neutral" rule must disregard outcomes. Rules
are neutral, as most people understand that term, even though their application
determines a winner. (The rules of baseball are neutral in this sense, although
39. Engstrom, supra note 5, at 282.
40. ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
POLITICS 462 (1968), as quoted in Gordon E. Baker, Threading the Political Thicket by Tracing the Steps
of the Late Robert G. Dixon, Jr.: An Appraisal and Appreciation, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING
ISSUES IN THE 1980s 21, 31 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982).
41. Hearings Before the Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, on S. 596, A Bill to Provide
a Fair Procedure for Establishing Congressional Districts, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 211, 218 (1979); see also,
Baker, supra note 40 at 32.
42. Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public
Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1985).
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they favor the teams with the "best" players.) A rule that calls the person who
gets the most votes in an election the "winner" is ordinarily thought of as
neutral, even though it favors popular over unpopular candidates. "Neutral,"
as applied to districting rules, as well as the other rules governing elections,
means according to generally accepted ideas of procedural fairness-in other
words, that the person who did win, should have won, with "should" drawing
its meaning from precisely the democratic ideas that are instantiated by holding
elections in the first place. The fact that we will never fully define terms like
fairness or neutrality does not diminish their utility.43 As Martin Shapiro has
noted, "decision makers often do, and indeed often must, move away from a
wrong position without being able to specify precisely what ideal position they
are moving toward."'
Lowenstein and Steinberg's own argument shows how difficult it is to hide
from the legitimate power of "neutral" rules. They have some of their own,
though they change the name to protect their innocence. What other people
might call "neutral" procedural rules, they call "pre-political." By this term
they mean "to describe procedures and values that govern the democratic
system within which substantive political conflicts occur and are worked
out."4" But if it is conceded that a set of pre-political ground rules exists, why
should the rules of districting be in principle excluded from it?'
Peter Schuck makes the case that gerrymandering is like any other "victory
bonus" conferred upon a majority party by winning at the polls.47 In this
view, gerrymandering should be no more offensive than such "bonuses" as
"patronage, logrolling opportunities, the opportunity to organize the legislative
chamber, the financial and other advantages of majority status," all of which
create a "power-enlarging effect.""
Gerrymandering, however, is a victory bonus with a difference. All of the
other "bonuses" that accrue to the victor serve a purpose other than pure
electoral aggrandizement. Patronage, for example, is one of two methods for
organizing a bureaucracy (the other is via an independent civil-service organi-
zation) and the patronage system has the advantage of ensuring some level of
responsiveness. Officials who can be removed at will have an extra incentive
to please their bosses, who in turn have an incentive to please the constituents
who elect them. Similarly, it is hard to imagine an alternative, legitimate
method to organize the legislative chamber apart from majority vote. Each of
43. On the importance of procedural due process, despite the lack of a precise definition, see EDMOND
CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 251 (1955).
44. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 228.
45. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 4 n. 12.
46. See discussion following note 120, 121.
47. Schuck, supra note 31, at 1359.
48. Id.
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these activities, unlike gerrymandering, is necessary to conducting legislative
business. 49
A more general problem with Schuck's categorization is that it wrongly
groups together "victory bonuses" which differ widely with respect to costs,
benefits, and the potential for cure. All "victory bonuses" are not created
equal. Even parties entitled to the "victory bonus" of patronage appointments
are bound by the rule in Elrod v. Burns,50  which forbids the patron-
age-motivated dismissal of non-policymaking government employees. Nor can
one doubt that if a majority party sought to reap its "victory bonus" by barring
members of the minority party from all committee assignments, or from a
franking privilege thitherto enjoyed by every member, or from collecting travel
expenses when members of the majority were entitled to do so, courts would
probably, and rightly, find a rationale for intervening."
The single-member district system itself is Schuck's most vivid example
of a "non-justiciable victory bonus." As has long been recognized, this system
inflates the majority party's influence in the legislature beyond what its popular
support warrants, by a factor inversely proportional to the size of its margin
of victory.5 2 According to Schuck, it "is difficult to see how one can maintain
a fair representation argument against partisan gerrymandering without at the
same time challenging single-member/plurality-vote districting . . . .Like a
partisan gerrymander, [it] rejects proportionality in favor of a victory bonus
for the majority party." 3
Again, Schuck avoids any realistic cost/benefit analysis of the "victory
bonus" at issue. The choice of a single-member district system can be defended
49. Schuck illuminates another difference between gerrymandering and other "victory bonuses" when
he argues that partisan gerrymandering is politically constrained-in other words, politicians will subject
themselves to too much political heat if they overdo it. Schuck, supra note 31, at 1327 n. 19. Yet, if they
have the votes, why should politicians hesitate to appropriate the "victory bonus" of gerrymandering? They
do not hesitate to appropriate any other bonus. They are not ashamed to assert exclusive control over
legislative agendas, although they hold the legislature by only a single vote. They are not ashamed to
designate only members of their party as committee chairs. They are not ashamed to logroll and compro-
mise and dispose of as much business as they can on straight party-line votes. Gerrymandering, however,
is different: Politicians do not gerrymander under claim of right, and Schuck, it appears, is not willing to
defend it on such terms.
50. 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (dismissals in the Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff's Department violated First
and Fourteenth Amendments). Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Democratic Process: Voter Standing
to Challenge Abuses of Incumbency, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 773 (1988) (arguing that suits alleging abuse of
incumbency are justiciable).
51. See generally Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
52. Many attempts have been made to quantify this "inflation." In theoretical computer models of
single-member district systems there is a standard curve which correlates the pro-majority bias to the size
of the majority. For any size of population and number of districts there is a formula for producing this
curve known as the "cube law of politics," a reference to an exponent in the formula which is held constant
and which provides an "index of proportionality." While the purely theoretical models have put this index
at three, actual electoral systems vary widely, and index results ranging from 0.71 to 4.4 have been
obtained. See Bernard Grofman, For Single-Member Districts Random is Not Equal, in REPRESENTATION
AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES IN THE 1980s, supra note 40, at 55.
53. Schuck, supra note 31, at 1359.
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on grounds independent of the current content of partisan politics. A district
system protects minority parties from the domination of statewide majorities
that can occur in at-large elections.54 This principle may not embody the spirit
of pure populist democracy, but it is an easily defensible goal in structuring
a democracy. 5
Nevertheless, it is even possible that this issue could become justiciable
if, for example, a legislature shifted back and forth between multi-member and
single-member districts for no apparent reason other than frustrating the
minority party. There is a pronounced difference between the decision to
continue to maintain a single-member district system on the one hand, and the
decision to gerrymander a legislature on the other. Most legislators probably
support the single-member district system because they prefer it as a democrat-
ic form. Perhaps they support it only because things have always been done
that way and, while they have not thought about it much, they vaguely suspect
that good democratic reasons could be educed to uphold it. But they support
gerrymandering for a different reason altogether: to spare themselves (and their
party) the burden of having to win elections by winning over voters.
C. The Undemocratic Intent to Gerrymander
How may gerrymandering be described so as to distinguish it from legiti-
mate partisan activity? Gerrymandering cannot be described purely by its
manifestations. A district map may look gerrymandered, but its wandering
district lines may have a nonpartisan explanation. They may even have been
drawn by the most outcome-disregarding criterion imaginable, the random walk
of a computer program. Nor may illicit districting be defined solely in terms
a disparity between votes cast and seats obtained, or in terms of "wasted"
votes, as these phenomena are common to all elections.
The additional element that gives gerrymandering its illicit character is
intent. It is one thing for a phenomenon to exist by necessity, and quite another
for someone to distribute or redistribute it selectively. For example, we know
that in any election a certain number of ballots will be lost, miscounted, or
spoiled, but that is no justification for someone intentionally miscounting or
spoiling ballots. The element of intent turns a misfortune into a crime. The
same is true when a legislature arranges for someone's vote to be wasted.
The crux is thus to define the intent to gerrymander in a way that distin-
guishes it from unobjectionable partisan aspirations like the intent to win
54. See supra note 30; see also GRIFFTH, supra note 11, at 47 (discussing defensive use of districts
in early state assemblies).
55. See DAHL, supra note 25, for discussion of "populistic" and "Madisonian" models of democracy;
see Hermens, supra note 26, for a discussion of the relative merits of single-member and proportional
representation systems.
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elections or to form a legislative majority. Such a distinction emerges from
considering how gerrymandering works. A gerrymanderer sets out to waste
the votes of the opposing party," in other words, to render ineffectual the
votes of certain voters in an election. Voters are selected, based on how they
have voted in the past and how they are likely to vote, for inclusion in a
minority bloc within a district. The gerrymanderer's sole purpose in doing this
is to increase his party's odds of electoral success.
The desire to be elected is harmless enough, but how one gets elected is
hardly a matter of indifference, any more than one is indifferent whether a
student's high mark on an exam was the product of hard study or cheating.
In a democracy, parties are supposed to gain political power by persuading
voters to vote for them. Paradigmatically, such persuasion takes the form of
non-coercive, rational appeals to the public interest and common welfare.
Everyone appreciates that this paradigm is far from reality, that appeals to the
electorate are often selfish, sometimes downright unpleasant, and that few
voters pay much attention to the larger demands of republican consciousness.
Still, persuasion is, and should be, the preferred method of getting elected.
Indeed, the extent to which any other method is used is the extent to which
the process is undemocratic. To elect, after all, means to choose.
Gerrymandering is a purely mechanical manipulation guided by the proba-
bilistic choice tendencies of given cohorts of voters. It is thus opposite in spirit
and in practice to the "rational persuasion" paradigm of getting votes. Gerry-
manderers engage in no appeal of any kind; indeed, their purpose is to elimi-
nate the need for any appeal. In a democratic society, at least of the American
variety, intending to gain power by some method other than appealing to voters
is prima facie wrong.
Thus, intent to gerrymander is the intent to do something undemocratic. 7
Indeed, it takes an heroic obtuseness to view gerrymandering in any other
light. "Gerrymander" belongs to the class of terms which William Safire calls
"attack words," and is always used polemically as a way to discredit the
56. The term "wasted votes" has two different meanings, although both are a form of electoral
mischance. A vote for a losing candidate could be described as "wasted," as could all votes cast for a
winner in excess of those necessary to constitute a majority. Given the fungibility of individual votes, no
one could ever look at a given ballot and identify it as a part of the superfluous votes rather than as a part
of the necessary majority, but in gross, as a statistical matter, the concept is both meaningful and clear.
57. All districting implicates this intent to some degree, but one cannot say that all districting is
gerrymandering, any more than one can say that all influence is bribery. It is possible to district with more
or less concern for partisan gain (although all plans will have a particular partisan effect). Gerrymandering
is distinguishable as overreaching, as an excess, as something that "goes too far." While the distinctions
may be hard to make, one is justified in trying to make them.
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opposition.58 Ordinary voters believe that gerrymandering is one of the ways
that scheming politicians frustrate the popular will.59
Ordinary voters are right. The most obvious purpose of a gerrymander is
to diminish the political efficacy of certain voters' votes. The minority party's
votes are that much less likely ever to influence elections. Politicians have that
much less need to pay attention to the views of voters whose franchise has
been attenuated. A person ought to be entitled to complain, for the sake of the
political community, if not for the integrity of one's own vote, if someone has
manipulated the lines on a map in order to make the outcome of an election
a foregone conclusion.
Any voter's vote is asymptotically meaningless, in the sense that virtually
never can one say that an individual's vote changed the outcome of an election,
but this fact does not show that gerrymandering is harmless.60 A vote cannot
be valued according to its probability of determining the outcome of an elec-
tion. As Paul Meehl has argued, a vote is not an economic or utilitarian object
because it is extraordinarily unlikely that any person's vote will ever determine
the outcome of an election-indeed, it is morally certain that it will not.6"
"Nobody is going to pay any attention to the last digit in a six place number
for the state of Minnesota's popular vote for the President, especially as we
all know that the voting machines and tabulations will contribute error larger
than that. "62
In that case, why bother to vote?63 The justification for voting cannot (in
Meehl's terminology) be "act-prospective egocentric," that is, utilitarian
self-interested.' 4 Rather, it must be "axionomic and sociotropic," that is, a
gesture embodying a statement of preference about a way of life based on a
purely ethical norm.6' A vote is a form of self-expression, a means to affirm
the philosophy of popular sovereignty. It is a symbolic act of power. That is
58. See, e.g., Picasso Democracy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1987, at A12; Stacking the House, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 2, 1985, at A28; George F. Will, California Scheming, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1983, at A29;
Gerryduck in Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1983, at A26; A FairBlow at Foul Districting, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 24, 1983, at A24. See also, GRIFFITH, supra note 11, at 18 (arguing that Federalist press used
gerrymander illustration in connection with newly-coined word, for campaign purposes).
59. "A California Field Poll taken in April [of 19891 found that 41% of those polled had no opinion
about the current redistricting plan. However, when voters were read a description of gerrymandering,
a whopping 82% disapproved of the process." Assault on the Gerrymander, WALL ST.J., Dec. 20, 1989,
at A14.
60. One could use the same sort of rationalization to justify any form of vote fraud.
61. Paul E. Meehl, The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument, 71 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 11 (1977). As Meehl points out, a person's chances of influencing the outcome of an election
are about even with his chances of getting killed driving to the polls. Id.
62. Id. at 14.
63. This question cuts very much deeper in the mathematically related context of people's behavior
buying lottery tickets. For a sophisticated explanation, see Daniel Kahnemann & Amos Tverski, Choices,
Values and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341 (1984).
64. Meehl, supra note 61, at 24.
'65. Id.
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why we ought not feel foolish casting a vote for a candidate we are sure will
lose. 66
A gerrymander not only decreases the actual power of voters, making their
votes that much less of a "live" threat to public officials, but more importantly,
it muffles the expression that a vote embodies. Because that is their aim,
gerrymanders become potent symbols in their own right. To the extent that
gerrymandering is accepted as a sanctioned part of partisan politics, it is a
public declaration that it is proper for the legislature to manipulate the constitu-
tive rules by which legislatures themselves are defined.
II. GERRYMANDERING AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
Even if we concede that gerrymandering exists and that it is probably a bad
thing, we still must address the issue of the propriety of judicial intervention.
Commentators who oppose the justiciability of gerrymandering argue that the
difficulties involved in identifying it make curing it impractical; or that even
if gerrymandering can be identified, fixing it would only bring worse evils in
train, such as requiring judges to perform a crucial regulatory function at the
heart of the political process.67 Others doubt that gerrymandering can be said
to violate any constitutional right.6
These objections to implementing an antigerrymandering principle will be
familiar to students of constitutional law, for the objections track the arguments
made by Justice Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr.69 Although this opinion record-
ed one of the most compelling arguments ever made against judges entering
political thickets, it was a dissent, and as a matter of constitutional doctrine,
it has been left far behind. Ironically, a number of scholars who accept the
"political thickets" argument with respect to gerrymandering reject that same
argument in connection with malapportionment and agree with the holding of
Baker. Yet as we shall see, the distinction between malapportionment and
gerrymandering is neither conceptually nor practically great. Indeed the appor-
tionment cases provide the ideal conceptual framework for defining gerryman-
dering as a constitutional violation. A consideration of these issues begins with
the Supreme Court's first attempt to deal with the problem.
66. Indeed, foolishness would be to vote with anything other than an expression interest in mind. This
analysis sheds light on the problem of "virtual representation," which concerns how a voter may be said
to be "represented" when casting a vote for a losing candidate. See Black, supra note 18, at 131, 140-1;
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986). A rational citizen ought to view a vote not as a potential
share of legislative power, but as a statement about democracy. The government's legitimacy does not
depend on the results of elections, but on the fact that elections-real elections-are held. Thus the voter
ought not feel disenfranchised as long as the electoral process was fair.
67. See, e.g., BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE (1984); Schuck, supra note 31;
Davis, 478 U.S. at 144 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. See, e.g., Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 42.
69. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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A. The Standard of Davis v. Bandemer
In Davis v. Bandemer, the Supreme Court held that claims of partisan
gerrymandering are justiciable as violations of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution. 70 The court relied on the notion advanced in Reynolds v.
Sims7t that a denial of "fair representation" can be a basis for a constitutional
claim, and on Gaffney v. Cummings, 72 in which the Court reached the merits
of a claim that the Connecticut legislature had constructed a bipartisan gerry-
mander.73 Six justices in Davis joined the holding that gerrymandering claims
were justiciable. 74 Regarding the specific claim that Indiana's House of Rep-
resentatives had been gerrymandered, a plurality held that the appellees,
Indiana Democrats, had failed to make the required showing of discriminatory
vote dilution.75 The Court reached this conclusion in the teeth of some fairly
incriminating evidence, both circumstantial and direct, that pointed to discrimi-
natory intrigues: although Democratic candidates received almost 52% of the
vote statewide in House races in 1982, they only won 43 of 100 seats; and in
two counties where Democratic candidates won 46.6% of the vote, they won
only 3 of 21 House seats.76
In assessing the claim of political gerrymandering, the plurality applied a
standard which originally had been used in race-based challenges to
multi-member districts.' 7 In those cases, a constitutional cause of action arises
where there is harm to an excluded group's "opportunity to participate "71 in
the "political process as a whole. "71 Under Davis, justiciable gerrymandering
claims include those brought by members of a political party as well as by
members of a minority race.80 The plurality made it clear that a claim of
gerrymandering must be based upon more than a mere lack of proportional
representation: "a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence
of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective
denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political pro-
cess. "81
70. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). See also Badham v. Eu, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989). The Court summarily affir-
med the dismissal of a gerrymandering'challenge to California's federal congressional districts, in which
the district court, 694 F. Supp. 664, 670 (N.D. Cal. 1988), simply applied the Davis criteria to the facts
and found that the "effects" test (see discussion below) had not been met.
71. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
72. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
73. See discussion in Davis, 478 U.S. at 119-20, 123.
74. Id. at 118-127.
75. Id. at 127-143.
76. Id. at 115; see id., 478 U.S. at 116 n.5 & 177-78 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting); see
also note 37, supra.
77. Id. at 131.
78. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 624 (1982), as quoted in Davis, 478 U.S. at 131.
79. Davis, 478 U.S. at 132.
80. Id. at 125.
81. Id. at 132-33.
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There can be no quarrel with the proposition that a lack of proportional
representation is not, without more, an adequate basis for judicial intervention
in the districting process, but the plurality's approach to gerrymandering is
flawed as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment law, and, partly as a result, is
unworkable in practice. The problem is in how the plurality sought to adapt
the law of racial discrimination to gerrymandering cases. In Fourteenth
Amendment race cases, complainants must establish the discriminatory intent
behind the practice that they challenge. In order to make proof of discrim-
ination realistically possible, the Court has permitted evidence of the discrimi-
natory "effect" or "impact" of a practice to serve, not as an independent basis
for finding a violation, but as indirect evidence of discriminatory intent.8 2
Yet in Davis v. Bandemer, the Court made a threshold showing of dis-
criminatory "effect" an independent, required element of a constitutional claim
of gerrymandering. 3 By altering the traditional secondary role of effects
evidence, the Court turned its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence almost
upside down, and at the same time made a constitutional violation practically
impossible to prove. The plurality seemed painfully aware of the innovation:
"Although this opinion relies on our cases relating to challenges by racial
groups . . . nothing herein is intended in any way to suggest an alteration of
the standards developed in those cases for evaluating such claims."" And
elsewhere: "We do not contemplate that a similar requirement would apply
to our Equal Protection cases outside of this particular context."85 Justice
Powell separately wrote that the effect standard had always been used as a
proxy: "The plurality wholly ignored the basic problem underlying ... prior
[equal protection] decisions, namely, that the plaintiffs came into court with
no direct proof of discriminatory intent."86
82. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
83. See, e.g., Davis, 478 U.S. at 139.
84. Id. at 132 n.13.
85. Id. at 134 n. 14.
86. See id. at 171 n.10. Justice White responded that "the effects test we cite was initially set forth
in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), which was decided before the Court expressly determined that
proof of discriminatory intent was a necessary component of an equal protection claim." 478 U.S. at 139
n. 17. The invocation of White v. Regester is dubious. White did not directly address the interplay of
discriminatory intent and effect, but it clearly relied on a history of intentional discrimination, citing, for
example, an absence of "good-faith" in "racial campaign tactics," and "invidious discrimination and
treatment in the fields of education, employment, economics, health, politics and [other areas]." White,
412 U.S. at 767-68.
The role of intent in Fourteenth Amendment discrimination cases is explained in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977):
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands
a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. The
impact of the official action-whether it 'bears more heavily on one race than another,' Washing-
ton v. Davis, supra, [426 U.S.] at 242-may provide an important starting point... [But a]bsent
a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the
Court must look to other evidence.
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The plurality compounded the problem for plaintiffs by failing to supply
a definition of the apparently critical term "effects." The Court dismissed as
mere evidence of intent, factors which could be seen as the effects of gerry-
mandering, such as "the shapes of the districts and their conformity with
political subdivision boundaries; and 'evidence concerning population dispari-
ties and statistics tending to show vote dilution'";87 though it later admitted,
incongruously, that such factors may be "relevant to a showing of the ef-
fects. "88 Even more surprising, the Court was ambivalent about the probative
value of the factor which most would consider the primary effect of gerry-
mandering, namely, skewed electoral results.
The plurality admitted that electoral results are relevant to a showing of
effect,89 but it insisted that an unconstitutional plan is one which will "consis-
tently degrade" voters' influence,9" and it emphasized that "[rielying on a
single election to prove unconstitutional discrimination is unsatisfactory."91
Given the relevance of election results, one would suppose that some measure
of proportional representation, albeit over more than one election, would
therefore be the test for gerrymandering.92 Yet the plurality seemed to spurn
this approach as well, criticizing Justice Powell's dissent on the grounds that
he would allow a violation "where the only proven effect on a political party's
electoral power was disproportionate results in one (or possibly two) elec-
tions. "13
What, then, establishes the effect of gerrymandering? Disproportionate
results over three elections? The one constant in the Davis Court's analysis is
the requirement that the plaintiff show that a political party has been denied
the opportunity to "participate in" or "influence" the "political process as a
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals
a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes. . . . The specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker's purpos-
es....
The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there are
contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or
reports. In some extraordinary instances the members might be called to the stand at trial to
testify concerning the purpose of the official action, although even then such testimony frequently
will be barred by privilege. Id. at 266-68.
The Davis Court was thus on shaky ground in claiming that it would use the standards evolved in race
bias cases as its guide. Had it undertaken the sort of "sensitive inquiry" envisioned in Arlington Heights,
considering historical, testimonial and other evidence, it could hardly have failed to sustain the trial
plaintiffs' position.
87. Davis, 478 U.S. at 138; see also id. at 142 n.20.
88. Davis, 478 U.S. at 141.
89. See, e.g., id. at 141, 142 n.20.
90. Id. at 132.
91. Id. at 135.
92. See id. at 156 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 141.
Yale Law & Policy Review
whole. " " In the context of gerrymandering, this test is virtually impossible
to meet. First, gerrymandering always involves creating a few districts where
the opposition party is sure to win, which forecloses an argument by plaintiffs
that they have been completely excluded from the political process. Second,
one of the nation's two major political parties may never have been so continu-
ously disadvantaged as to have suffered the requisite "historical patterns of
exclusion from the political processes.""' After all, even Chicago has some
Republican alderman. Gerrymandering claims, while justiciable in principle,
would in practice never succeed on the merits.96
Applying its test to the Indiana Democrats, the Court noted that the "Dis-
trict Court did not find that because of the 1981 [districting] Act the Democrats
could not in one of the next few elections secure a sufficient vote to take
control of the assembly" or that "the Democrats would have no hope of doing
any better in the reapportionment that would occur after the 1990 census. " 97
Hence, even the possibility of success at the polls can forestall a claim of
gerrymandering.
It is an indictment of the Davis plurality's test that it provides no incentive
for gerrymanderers to do anything differently.9" A partisan mapmaker will
still gerrymander as much as possible. The challenger must then embark on
a fool's errand to try to prove its present and prospective lack of influence on
the political process. Even if the plaintiff miraculously prevails on the merits,
the gerrymanderer will still control the outcome of at least two out of the five
elections held after a decennial redistricting. 99
With such a crabbed view of the substantive offense, one wonders why the
Court held that gerrymandering claims were justiciable at all. The best evi-
dence of gerrymandering, including the facts surrounding the process of
drawing district maps, the shapes of districts, and even the sworn admissions
of legislators, is disregarded as merely bearing on the issue of discriminatory
intent-and that despite the fact that prior discrimination law had considered
the issue of intent to be paramount. Evidence of lack of proportional represen-
tation is deemed relevant-though, ironically, focusing on such evidence risks
embroiling the Court in politics in the very manner it presumably sought to
94. Id. at 131-33.
95. Id. at 131 n.12.
96. It is telling that the classic, effective gerrymanders in Indiana and California were not interdicted.
97. Davis, 478 U.S. at 135-36.
98. There is not even the incentive to shroud one's partisan designs in a decorous silence. See infra,
note 37.
99. In response to a challenge by the dissent, the plurality suggested that "projected" election results
may establish a case of gerrymandering. Davis, 478 U.S. at 139 n. 17. It seems highly doubtful that the
Court would agree to adjudicate a contest among social scientists and statisticians when it was unpersuaded
by the actual results in Indiana's elections.
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avoid in formulating such a high threshold showing. t ° The "opportunity to
participate" standard either requires the courts to make political assessments
of partisan power, or defines gerrymandering in a manner which ensures that
no successful claim will ever be brought.
B. Individual Rights and "One Person, One Vote"
The Davis plurality took a wrong turn at the outset. It miscast the nature
of the injury resulting from gerrymandering, by deciding that the "group level
• ..must be our focus in this type of claim."'t' Thus, "in order to succeed,
the Bandemer plaintiffs were required to prove ... intentional discrimination
against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on
that group."" ° In other words, the plaintiff is injured not as a person or a
citizen, but as a Democrat or a Republican.
But that is wrong. Gerrymandering as a constitutional violation is not
something that Democrats and Republicans do to each other. Gerrymandering
is something that legislators do to voters. l3 The apportionment cases provide
a useful legal framework within which the harm of gerrymandering can be
placed and considered. These cases focused exclusively upon the harm suffered
by individuals as voters. Even though the Court in Reynolds v. Sims recognized
that nationwide malapportionment tended to advance the interests of rural areas
at the expense of urban areas,'04 its attention remained fixed on the individual
right that malapportionment violated. It should have made no difference to the
outcome in Reynolds had the Court been persuaded that legislators from
malapportioned districts were properly sensitive to urban concerns, or that they
passed legislation which was fair to everyone.
Rather, the Reynolds Court focused on the legislature's discriminatory act
of classification: "the concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed
as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to
the governmental action questioned or challenged." " Similarly, in Gray v.
100. See, e.g., Justice O'Connor's warning in Davis that reform will inevitably lead to a judicially
managed form of proportional representation. Id. at 156.
101. Id. at 125 n.9.
102. Id. at 127.
103. The analogy to race bias was misguided from the start. People are not born into a political party
the way they are born into a race, regardless of what partisans may say. Discrimination against Republicans
and Democrats cannot fruitfully be compared on any level to the historical exclusion of, and discrimination
against, minorities.
104. See, e.g., 377 U.S. at 567-68.
105. Id. at 565. The Court continued: "With respect to the allocation of legislative representation,
all voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same relation regardless of where they live. Any suggested
criteria for the differentiation of citizens are insufficient to justify any discrimination, as to the weight of
their votes, unless relevant to the permissible purposes of legislative apportionment." Id. Justice Powell
advocated a similar approach in Davis v. Bandemer: "When deciding where [district] lines will fall, the
State should treat its voters as standing in the same position, regardless of their political beliefs or party
affiliation." 478 U.S. at 166.
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Sanders, it emphasized that "there is no indication in the Constitution that
homesite .. . affords a permissible basis for distinguishing between qualified
voters within the State."' t 6
While the Court's language in the apportionment cases contains sweeping
claims about the purposes and goals of reapportionment, 7 the legal argu-
ment "must be concentrated upon ascertaining whether there has been any
discrimination against certain of the State's citizens which constitutes an
impermissible impairment of their constitutionally protected right to vote." 08
The Court found this impairment in the intentional "dilution" of the votes of
people living in overpopulated districts.
Searching for precedents to justify judicial intervention, the Court cited
cases where the right to vote was completely denied; °9 however, as the dis-
senters argued, "denial" of the right to vote is not the same as "dilution" of
that right. Justice Stewart wrote, "[n]obody's right to vote has been denied [by
malapportionment]. Nobody's right to vote has been restricted. Nobody has
been deprived of the right to have his vote counted. The voting right cases
which the Court cites are, therefore, completely wide of the mark."110 Justice
Frankfurter argued in Baker that "[a]ppellants invoke the right to vote and to
have their votes counted. But they are permitted to vote and their votes are
counted . . . Talk of 'debasement' or 'dilution' is circular talk."11
The dissenters had a point. The Court has spoken at times as if the harm
to voters from malapportionment were measurable: "The resulting discrim-
ination against those individual voters living in disfavored areas is easily
demonstrable mathematically. Their right to vote is simply not the same right
to vote as that of those living in a favored part of the State."11 A moment's
reflection reveals that the harm of malapportionment is not so simply cast. For
the harm to be mathematically demonstrable, one first must make a number
of assumptions, such as that voter turnout will be equal in every district. If
106. Gray, 372 U.S. at 380; see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566-68; Baker, 369 U.S. at 207-08, 242,
253-54; Wesberry, 376 U.S. 1, 6, 14, 17-18 (1964).
107. See, e.g, Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565-66 ("each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full
and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies"; "each citizen [shall]
have an equally effective voice in the election of members"; "fair and effective representation for all
citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment.")
108. Id. at 561.
109. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 201-02, 208, 247-48; see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554-55. For cases
in which the right to vote was denied, see, e.g., Ex Parie Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (ballot-box
stuffing); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) (same); United States v. Mosely, 238 U.S. 383
(1915) (failure to count votes); Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (physical assault of voters); Guinn
v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) ("grandfather" laws and literacy tests); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939) (same); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (statutes explicitly denying right to vote on
account of race); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (statutes which denied right to vote on account
of race by allowing political parties to "set the rules" for voting in primaries).
110. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 744 (1964).
111. 369 U.S. at 299-300 (footnote omitted).
112. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 563.
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there are ten thousand eligible voters in each of two properly apportioned dis-
tricts, and all the voters in one district turn out for an election but only half
in the other district do, the voters in the second district each have twice as
much actual effect on the outcome of the election as the voters in the first, and
their votes have twice as much "value." The "mathematical" harm to the voter
is really a calculation of the potential value of a vote cast in a hypothetical
election where turnout is even across districts." 3
The only undeniable harm was the discriminatory acts of classification by
the state: "14
It would appear extraordinary to suggest that a State could be constitutionally
permitted to enact a law providing that certain of the State's voters could vote
two, five, or 10 times .... And it is inconceivable that a state law to the effect
that... the votes of citizens in one part of the State would be multiplied by two,
five, or 10... could be constitutionally sustainable. Of course, the effect of state
legislative districting schemes which give the same number of representatives to
unequal numbers of constituents is identical."
5
Malapportionment, then, is not a denial of the right to vote, but rather a
dilution of that right, the magnitude of which is unspecifiable. What vote
113. The "one person, one vote" principle is hardly a foundational norm, like the decision to have
democracy in the first place. See, e.g., Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 20 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (malapportionment
has always been the norm in American politics). Indeed, it is entirely possible that a seriously mal-
apportioned legislature will provide "fair and effective" representation. Furthermore, the "one person,
one vote" standard may actually work against "fair and effective" representation, for example in the case
of a traditionally underrepresented minority group which would benefit if the law required a certain
minimum group representation. See Shapiro, supra note 21, at 232-33 (discussing Justice Marshall's dissent
in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 103 (1980)).
The work-a-day, non-platonic character of the equal population principle is indicated by the manner
in which it is applied. For example, when the Court chooses "the total number of residents" as the
population base to be equalized, it turns its back on other populations which could have been used as a
base with equal plausibility-registered voters, potentially eligible voters, probable voters, citizens, adult
citizens, or adults. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91-97 (1966). We have no principled basis,
other than the necessity of making a choice, for preferring "total populations" to another criterion. Each
choice forecloses the possibility of "equality" in some other sense. The gross population standard that was
chosen ignores differences in voter registration or turnout. It also has an unequal impact from state to state.
The ideal congressional district in Idaho will have a population, based on the 1980 census, of about
472,000; in Oregon it will be 525,000, so one person's vote in Oregon will be worth about 89% of one
person's vote in Idaho.
More revealing is the Court's treatment of permissible exceptions to the strict equal population standard
in the context of state legislative districts. In order to establish a prima facie case of malapportionment in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, claimants must show population variations of at least 10% between
the largest and smallest districts. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-3 (1983). Any smaller
deviations are within the discretion of the legislature. Yet even a discrepancy of greater than 10% may
be allowed if the state offers evidence that it is pursuing a "rational state policy." Mahan v. Howell, 410
U.S. 315, 328 (1973). In Brown, the average population deviation between districts was 16%, and the
deviation between the largest and smallest district was 90%. 462 U.S. at 838.
In short, the equal population standard only guarantees a minimum quantum of electoral process. These
observations should temper the prejudice that the equal population criterion is somehow more important,
more fundamental, less political, than other electoral rules.
114. Of course some actual diminution in the power of a voter does occur in elections held in
malapportioned districts. The point is that the attenuation is in practice impossible to quantify, and by itself
forms a poor basis for the justiciability of malapportionment.
115. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562-63.
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dilution and vote denial have in common is the state's act of discriminatory
classification. Viewed in this light, gerrymandering is a violation of the same
individual right recognized in Baker, Wesberry, and Reynolds-the right to be
free of governmental tampering with one's vote. The only group element in-
volved is that the voters who were fouled were chosen for the honor because
of the presumed strength of their affinity for candidates of one party or anoth-
er. We may as well characterize the equal population criterion as a group
right, since malapportionment was historically directed against an identifiable
group composed of urban voters."'
Legal scholars who have written about these problems have labored mighti-
ly to rationalize a serious and revealing inconsistency in their legal world view.
Gerrymandering and malapportionment are closely related, but most commen-
tators consider Baker v. Carr to be rightly decided if not sacrosanct, while
making grave justiciability objections to gerrymandering claims ("courts ought
to stay out of political thickets").
For example, Daniel Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg proffer a distinc-
tion between group rights and individual rights to explain the inconsistency,
asserting that gerrymandering cannot be recognized as a cause of action
because it cannot be said to implicate anything but a group right (which consti-
tutionally speaking does not exist), while "it is at least plausible" that appor-
tionment implicates an individual right.' 17 Their explanation as to why mal-
apportionment violates an individual right is that "if one district is substantially
more populous than another it makes sense to argue that a vote cast in the first
district is devalued compared to one cast in the second.""8 This may be so
(although they never address the assumptions which underlie talk of votes
being "equal" or "devalued"), but it also "makes sense" to argue that if
individuals are targeted by the state legislature to suffer an electoral misfortune
which would otherwise afflict them only by accident, then their franchise is
"devalued" when compared to others. This would be true irrespective of who
wins the election. Lowenstein and Steinberg, however, argue that plaintiffs
must be complaining either that they cannot affect the actual outcome of
elections, or that their preferred candidate did not win." 9
Lowenstein and Steinberg have an alternative argument why malapportion-
ment cases are distinguishable from gerrymandering cases. They say that the
rule of "one person, one vote" has now become a "pre-political" principle,
and so is among the "ground rules that constitute and, therefore, precede the
political struggle."120 However, a principle that did not begin as "pre-po-
116. See generally Shapiro, supra note 21, at 233-36 (discussing group rights).
117. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 12-13.
118. Id. at 13.
119. Id. at 13-14.
120. Id. at 75.
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litical" can hardly evolve there. "One person, one vote" was not a pre-consti-
tutional principle of district-making. "' Until Reynolds v. Sims, "one person,
one vote" was not even a required element of the political equation. It has only
been there for twenty-five years, hardly long enough for a legal rule to be
translated into an irreducible axiom of democratic practice, uniquely beyond
the scope of legal reasoning. If twenty-five years is long enough, it is plausible
to believe that twenty-five years from whenever the Supreme Court recognizes
a compactness-based antigerrymandering principle, it shall have become pre-
political as well.
Professor Schuck's attempt to distinguish malapportionment and gerryman-
dering fails for similar reasons. According to Shuck:
[First,] the "one person, one vote" principle has proved to be judicially manage-
able... [second,] partisan gerrymandering is politically constrained in ways that
pre-Baker malapportionment, which often resulted from the legislature simply
doing nothing in the face of population shifts, was not .... Finally, the popula-
tion equality principle has achieved a public acceptance and settled character in
our political system.' "
None of these points is persuasive as a means of distinguishing an
antigerrymandering principle from that of "one person, one vote." Just as there
are judicially manageable criteria to define and remedy departures from the
principle of "one person, one vote," there are such criteria to prevent gerry-
mandering. Moreover, whether it is true that gerrymandering needs no remedy
because it is already politically constrained is an open, empirical question.
Those familiar with recent gerrymanders, such as the one in Indiana that led
to Davis v. Bandemer or the "Burtonization"'" of California in 1981, would
probably giggle at the assertion that gerrymandering was constrained by the
political process.' 24 Surely it would be more convincing to argue that gerry-
mandering is too tough a problem to ask a court to fix rather than that it is
such an easy problem that it fixes itself.
121. Contiguity was, however, such a pre-constitutional principle. If one were committed to under-
standing the role of pre-political principles in drawing district lines, it is with contiguity, not equinumero-
sity, that one should begin. See infra part II1.A.
122. Schuck, supra note 31, at 1327 n.19.
123. See Mitch Betts, Gerrymandering Made Easy in 1990, COMPUTERWORLD, August 28, 1989, pp.
1, 18 ("Burton" is "(Often used as a verb as in 'to Burton.') The late Congressman Phillip Burton, a San
Francisco Democrat, drew an extremely partisan map for California's congressional districts after the 1980
census. It was designed to add five Democrats to the California delegation and slaughter Republicans.")
For a good account of the brouhaha, see Lowell & Craigie, supra note 37.
124. One of the main reasons Schuck offers for thinking that gerrymandering is politically constrained
in comparison to malapportionment is that gerrymanderers have to be active; they have to gerrymander
and re-gerrymander, and every time they do it, they may have to fight. A malapportioner, on the other
hand, can just sit and do nothing. Schuck, supra note 31. Although reapportionment cases dealt with district
plans that had been passed more than 50 years earlier, the issue of apportionment/malapportionment was
a constant irritant in legislatures, and at times it gave rise to strong controversy. Serious disputes arose
more often than once in 10 years, and they consumed a great deal of legislative energy. See RIcHARD C.
CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES (1970). The fact that these altercations did not result in the existing
plans being modified does not prove the issue was not contentious; it is rather a tribute to the institutional
gridlock that malapportionment had caused.
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 9:301, 1991
Schuck's last argument is that "one person, one vote" has wide public
acceptance, whereas an antigerrymandering principle has no comparable
consensus behind it."2 Both prongs of this assertion are dubious. On one
hand, the wide acceptance of "one person, one vote" was an ex post phenome-
non. No broad popular movement was clamoring for the result in Reynolds at
the time it was decided.126 On the other hand, an antigerrymandering princi-
ple probably can claim a large and influential constituency of newspaper
editorialists, good government reformers, and, in brief, the same sorts of
people who would have supported Reynolds in 1964.17
III. COMPACTNESS AS A REMEDY FOR GERRYMANDERING
The apportionment decisions lend credence to the notion that a valid
election only occurs where the process is fair. A compactness standard could
be embodied in the law using a similar "fair-process" approach.' 28 The act
of gerrymandering, defined as the drawing of district lines in a manner intend-
ed to inflate the districting party's majority in the legislature, violates the
individual rights of those whose votes are meant to be diminished. 129 Recog-
nizing that all district plans are partisan to some extent, courts could limit their
intervention to cases in which gerrymandering violated certain clear procedural
norms.
If a substantial challenge were made to the noncompactness of a district
plan, for example, by proffering a more compact plan, then a prima facie case
of gerrymandering would be made out, and the state would have to provide
acceptable, nonpartisan reasons for having drawn its district lines as it did.
125. Schuck, supra note 31, at 1327 n.19.
126. The contrary is probably closer to the truth. When he was Solicitor General and arguing in behalf
of plaintiffs in one of the reapportionment cases, Archibald Cox privately believed that the "one person,
one vote" standard would be so radical a departure from American political tradition that "the country
would not accept it as law." ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 288, 297 (1987).
127. See also note 59, supra.
128. Courts regularly prefer "fair process" standards over "actual prejudice" standards. For example,
the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection may be violated where members of a racial group
deliberately have been excluded from jury venire lists, see, e.g., Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1977), even though thejurors who were chosen were concededly fair judges of the facts. The constitutional
right is violated, not by an unfair outcome, but by an unfair process. By contrast to a "fair process"
approach, an "actual prejudice" standard will only overturn a result where a plaintiff has in fact been
harmed by discriminatory action. One way of capturing the inconsistency of legal scholars who favor Baker
but dislike Davis, and the inconsistency of the Davis plurality itself, is to note that they would apply "fair
process" rules to apportionment cases, but only "actual prejudice" rules to gerrymandering cases.
129. We do not flesh out in this article the exact contours of an equal protection argument appropriate
for a legal brief, but we note that discriminatory state action should be easy to prove, and that voting rights
cases merit "strict scrutiny" under the Supreme Court's current doctrine. Even under the "rational
relationship" test, gerrymandering would be hard to defend.
The Third Criterion
Any voter whose vote was targeted for diminution by being deliberately placed
in a minority district ought to have standing to sue. 30
Before a compactness standard can operate as a legal criterion, one must
show that compactness is a valuable safeguard, that noncompactness is a
reliable gauge of partisan gerrymandering, and that a workable method of
determining compactness exists. The following section argues that the criterion
of compactness is intimately related to other procedural safeguards which all
agree are necessary for fair elections.
A. Equinumerosity, Contiguity and Compactness
One may take it as given that those in present charge of the government
would prefer to control who gets elected to office if they could manage it.
They could manage it infallibly if they were entitled to say, on an ad hoc basis,
whose vote would count and whose would not. Democracy, as the term is
commonly understood, precludes this sort of ad hoc choosing. Democracy
implies a fairly steady state of constitutive rules that control and constrain the
way in which such choices can be made. There is no possibility, of course,
for these rules to be in a steady state unless they at least minimally constrain
political manipulations. Such rules might specify, for example, that there must
be a certain number of districts, defined beforehand; that an elector may vote
only once; that an elector must vote only in the district to which he is assigned;
and that whoever gets the most votes in each given district is elected.
The foregoing criteria are a bare-bones version of the sort of rules that are
required in order to allow the idea of a democratic election to operate at all.
The question is whether and how far these criteria could prevent those current-
ly in power from doing what we assume comes naturally, namely, determining
who wins each election. Key to the operation of these criteria is a substantive
idea of what is meant by a "district."
130. These voters would most clearly have standing. Two other categories of voters are arguably
harmed by a gerrymander, but it is less clear that they would have standing. First, there are the statewide
minority party voters who are deliberately placed in districts to create vote-wasting supermajorities (the
.packing" phase of a gerrymander). They are targeted in some sense by the. districting legislation, but the
Davis plurality seems right in suggesting that they can claim no individual harm, since in their district they
are part of a majority. 478 U.S. at 140-41. Second, there are the statewide majority party voters who are
placed in the minority in one of those districts that were created by partisans to waste the votes of the other
party. Although these voters are not members of the targeted political party, it would be logical to give
them standing because they were deliberately placed in the minority in a partisan gerrymander. Although
those voters might not want to bring a suit, because doing so could harm their party's power in the legisla-
ture, giving them standing is consistent with our emphasis on the individual harm caused by gerryman-
dering.
A last class of voters in a gerrymander, members of the statewide majority who are placed in the majority
in their districts, would not seem to have standing, unless we conceded everyone standing because of an
individual right to have the government constituted by fair process.
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We have an ingrained notion that an electoral district is a place, like
Chicago, but a district is not necessarily so. A district could be defined as the
members of the Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences, or as the
members of the legal profession or the pipefitters' union, or indeed, a district
could be a purely theoretical construct describing that set of voters, wherever
resident, whom we designate as a district. Under the four rules we mention,
assuming no others applied, it would be easy for those in power to rig favor-
able electoral outcomes.
Imagine a hypothetical state with ten million inhabitants, each of whom
belonged to one of two parties. The state has twenty districts and is to hold
an election for representative in each. Someone with absolute control over the
districting process could afford to be practically indifferent to how much
popular support his party enjoys. If he can identify only nineteen "friendlies"
in the entire state, he will be able to win the election in nineteen districts by
designating each of them as a district. Each district so constituted would then
elect its representative by a majority vote of one to zero. Success could not
be guaranteed in the mammoth twentieth district, comprising everyone else in
the state. The vote there would depend on how popular the friendlies were in
the population as a whole. In principle, they could lose by the inglorious tally
of 9,999,981 to zero. The state's delegation would then be nineteen friendlies
and one (very popular) "unfriendly."131
Such outcomes can be and are ruled out, of course, by further refining the
concept of "district." In Reynolds and Wesberry the Supreme Court took this
step by holding that all districts must have approximately equal populations.
This requirement ("equinumerosity") substantially diminishes the ability to
affect outcomes. If an equinumerosity constraint applies, nineteen out of ten
million would come nowhere near assuring a favorable electoral outcome in
even a single district, no matter how much discretion one otherwise has.
Surprisingly, however, the principle of equinumerosity is practically
helpless, acting all by itself, to ensure what one would normally think of as
majority rule. Suppose the voters in our state are precisely split in their support
of the two parties. In theory, if equinumerosity were the only constraint, the
friendlies would still be able to engineer victories for themselves in nineteen
out of twenty of the districts, by ceding to the opposition an enormous majority
in one district, and then cobbling up slim majorities in the other nineteen.132
Constructing these majorities should be a straightforward business because the
131. Majoritarianism does little to restrain partisan abuse, but it has one small virtue: it makes it
difficult to win that last district. The twentieth district will be impossible to win unless the friendlies have
the support of fifty-percent-plus-twenty.
132. Ideally, to make these majorities as secure as possible, the friendlies would cede the one district
to the unfriendlies by a margin of 100% to zero.
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rules as stated so far still allow partisans to assign any voter in the state to any
district in the state.
Under this regime, an election in which the equinumerosity constraint had
been conscientiously obeyed could be just as undemocratic as where one person
was designated as an entire district. The result from our hypothetical state can
be generalized: no matter how many districts there are, a party with 50%
support can theoretically win in all the districts but one.'33 In a state with
45 districts (for example, California in the 1980s) a resourceful partisan hand
could fashion victories in 44 of those districts. In a state with 500 districts,
skimpy majorities could be arranged in 499. Admittedly, these are theoretical
extremes, and as the number of districts increases it becomes harder to create
safe majorities in all but one district."34 There are, however, entirely realistic
versions of this problem that make it clear that population equality alone is an
all but meaningless limitation on malign partisanship.
No matter how many districts in the state, although the friendlies have the
support of only 50% of the state's voters, they can, even while adhering to
the principle of equinumerous districts, guarantee themselves 25% margin
victories in 80% of the races."' Smaller margins could well be tolerable,
because districts constructed without regard for where voters live do not
change their character as people move about the state. If they were prepared
to risk victory margins of only 10% the friendlies could guarantee themselves
wins in 90% of all districts.1 36
Other strange results are possible where only "one person, one vote" stays
the partisan hand. For example, a minority party which controls the districting
process can assure itself a majority of legislative seats as long as it polls more
than 25 % of the popular vote. 137 Also possible is a ferocious brand of major-
ity rule: a party that controls the districting process and polls an amount
133. The only mathematical limit on this tactic is the requirement that the number of voters in an
average district be at least twice the number of districts minus one. Thus our 20 districts must each contain
at least 38 voters before we can assure wins in 19 districts with only 50% of the statewide vote. As a
practical matter, the number of voters in a district will be much larger than the number of districts.
134. We have assumed apportionment on the basis of voter registration. If noncontiguous districts are
apportioned by total population, the opportunities to influence elections are further increased. The crafty
tactical move would be to create small majorities of voters by packing a district with nonvoting residents.
In spirit, this maneuver is similar to creating one-person districts which are won by a vote of 1 to 0.
135. That is, 62.5% to 37.5%. The other 20% of the districts would be ceded to the opposition, which
would carry them unanimously.
136. Specifically, the margins would be 55.56% to 44.44% in the contested districts, with the others
being carried unanimously by the hapless unfriendlies. If confident enough to risk margins of only 5%,
the friendlies could carry 95% of all districts, with the margin in contested districts at 52.63% to 47.36%.
137. This result depends on the same technique described earlier, where districts are ceded to the
opposition by unanimous margins, thereby wasting the maximum number of opposition votes. The power
of such a minority is greatly increased as its support increases beyond 25%. Thus, a party which wins 45%
at the polls and controls the districting process can use this method to win 75% of the seats.
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greater than 50% of the vote can, in theory, win 100% of the seats in the
legislature. '
The root cause of these undemocratic outcomes is still traceable to the
inadequate constraint on what is meant by a "district." An additional rule,
importing a rudimentary notion of "place," is necessary to prevent such
results. The concept of contiguity remedies this defect. The idea of contiguity
is so integrated with our concept of what a district is that it generally remains
unanalyzed.3 9 Although a majority of states have either constitutional or
statutory contiguity requirements," 4 the Supreme Court has never said that
a district must be composed of contiguous areas. Cases involving contiguity
typically deal with such questions as what land is contiguous to what, or how
insubstantial a connection may be without becoming noncontiguous, or when
land is contiguous although isolated by a body of water. 4 ' So far as we are
aware, only one court has held that a district may be composed of two or more
genuinely discrete, isolated, independently contiguous plots located on the same
land mass. 42
Despite the courts' inattention, contiguity is not just a gracenote in the
score of democracy; it is crucial, both practically and theoretically. Without
the constraint of contiguity, equinumerosity is so diminished that its only real
value is symbolic. A contiguity requirement exponentially shrinks the number
of available districting options, because in constructing one district, the map-
138. The technique is to create a majority-minority split in each district which precisely mirrors the
majority-minority split statewide. Thus a party that leads its opponent 55% to 45% in a state would create
a 55-45 majority in every single district.
139. See, e.g., Grofman, supra note 9, at 84 ("Contiguity is a relatively trivial requirement and usually
a noncontroversial one"); Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship Between Votes and Seats: The Ultimate
Question in Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REV. 185, 187 (1985) ("That political districts should
be contiguous-that all parts of a district should be connected-is not likely to be important in gerrymander-
ing cases because it is relatively noncontroversial."). The technical definition of contiguity is satisfied when
one can travel from one part of a district to any other part without having to leave the district.
140. See Grofman, supra note 9, at 177-80 (Table 3).
141. See, e.g., Wells v. Rockefeller, 311 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd., 398 U.S. 901 (1970);
Badillo v. Katz, 73 Misc. 2d 836, 343 N.Y.S.2d 451 (N.Y. 1973); Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976 (R.I.
1984).
142. In Dillard v. Town of Louisville, 730 F. Supp. 1546 (M.D. Ala. 1990), the court approved a
district map submitted by the town council, intended to comply with the Voting Rights Act, in which the
town's fifth district was divided into two separate parts. Id. at 1548-49. The only case we have found in
which noncontiguous territories were amalgamated into one district, this precedent has radical implications
of which the court was seemingly innocent.
Even where contiguity has been adhered to, ingenuity, even audacity, has sometimes been displayed.
One federal case has established that a highway bridge is sufficient to establish contiguity. Wells, 311 F.
Supp. at 53. California's Sixth congressional district "has four distinct and detached parts. Two are
connected only by water, the other two by a narrow piece of land used for railroad yards." A Recipe for
Gerrymandering, 1 CONG. QUARTERLY, STATE POLITICS AND REDISTRICTING 149 (1982). New York's
City Council proposed a map that had one district connected "for nearly two miles" by "the Coney Island
Boardwalk." The district was "not contiguous at high tide." Sam Roberts, Redistricting Oddities Reflect
Racial and Ethnic Politics, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1991, at BI. The plan was rejected by the Justice
Department for other reasons.
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maker necessarily forecloses the possibility of constructing countless others
which would intersect the first.'43
But whatever contiguity adds to a gerrymanderer's burdens, noncompact-
ness can take away. Noncompactness may render contiguity irrelevant as a
constraint. For any existing scheme of contiguous districts, a single voter, no
matter where in the state he lives, could in theory be included in any district
by means of a gerrymandered plan that neither displaces any other voter nor
renders any part of any district noncontiguous. Further, for any spatial ar-
rangement of voters, a scheme of contiguous districts can be constructed such
that each district contains only those voters that have been specified in ad-
vance, regardless of where they live.'
If every name in the Manhattan phone book is randomly associated with
one of ten districts, a map can be constructed that will place every voter in a
literally contiguous district no matter which combination of names and districts
are chosen. The resulting district map would certainly look odd-in places,
districts might be stretched thin as telephone wires-but it can be done, regard-
less of where the voters live. Thus, from the viewpoint of a partisan map-
maker, compactness and contiguity are a single entity, and freedom from the
constraint of compactness is equivalent to freedom from contiguity as well.
In such a world, abusive results are predictable events. To rule out this sort
of situation, one needs a third criterion: Districts must be compact.
14
143. See, e.g., Peter J. Taylor, Graham Gudgin & R.J. Johnston, The Geography of Representation:
A Review of Recent Findings, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEiR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 183, 188
(Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart eds. 1986) ("With no constraints except equal numbers of base units
per district, the number of combinations of n base-units to produce m districts is given by . . .
n!/(m(n/m)!m!) ... With 20 base-units to be divided into 4 districts of 5 units each, this comes to 24,310
solutions! The addition of a contiguity constraint on the solutions will reduce this number. For Newcastle
upon Tyne 20 wards combine into 334 solutions of contiguous patterns of 4 constituencies, for example.").
144. A rough analytic proof of this proposition proceeds as follows. First, consider any set of
contiguous districts; imagine, for example, a chess board in which each square is a district. If we wanted
the square at one corner of the board to include a resident of the square at the opposite corner, we could
extend a thin tentacle from the first square that would wind along the existing boundaries of the other
squares-never cutting through them-until it reached the target square. There it would stair-step around
the current residents until it reached the target voter. If this can be done once, it can be done an infinite
number of times. Of course districts may look quite awful. If the two squares on the opposite long diagonal
wanted to swap some voters as well, they would have to extend contiguous tentacles around the boundary
of the first district described above, which already cuts almost completely across the chess board. But it
can be done. The only limiting assumption is that voters cannot reside precisely on the state boundary, so
that there is room between them and it sufficient to insert a contiguous tentacle.
145. The available definitions of compactness, including one we hold to be the most workable, are
discussed in part III.D. One may concede that, even in the absence of a compactness constraint, various
real-world factors inhibit noncompact gerrymandering. For example, no line-drawer has yet had the chutzpa
to run a district line through the middle of someone's bedroom (though shame did not prevent the creation
of California's 32nd congressional district after the 1980 census), but even within these not-especially
confining confines, partisan mapmakers can thrive. Where partisans are given a lever, they have proved
willing to try to move the world. For an example of how skewed district populations were in the apportion-
ment cases, see Maryland Com. for Fair Rep. v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 665 (1964) (counties "with only
14.1% of the total state population" could elect a majority of the Maryland Senate; a population ratio of
32 to 1 existed between the least- and most-populous electoral counties; "Calvert County, where only
15,826 resided" was "entitled to one Senate seat, while Baltimore County, with a 1960 population of
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The antimanipulation power of equinumerosity, contiguity, and compactness
are mechanically interdependent: if any one is entirely ignored, then the other
two fail as guarantors against partisan manipulations. At present only popula-
tion equality has been constitutionally required, but if the efficacy of the equal
population principle depends on at least some minimal requirement of contigu-
ity, to that extent contiguity must also be constitutionally required. If contiguity
can in its turn be rendered meaningless without a compactness criterion, to that
extent compactness must be constitutionally required.'46
B. Compactness as a Restraint On "Partisan Lust"1
47
The compactness requirement interdicts a technique that is indispensable
to creating effective gerrymanders. People do not naturally arrange themselves
to suit the purposes of a gerrymanderer. Residents must be placed in appropri-
ate districts. Toward this end, district lines are stretched and shrunk, and in
the process districts become noncompact. Thus, where compactness is a
constraint, a gerrymanderer's job is noticeably harder. 4  A compactness
requirement would not end all gerrymandering, but it would diminish its
practical value to partisans. So long as partisan mapmakers are left with any
discretion whatsoever, strategic line-drawing will continue to exist, but the
worst cases-that category which the Supreme Court is certain must exist, but
for which adequate diagnostic criteria have never been proposed-almost
certainly can be ruled out.
492,428" was "likewise entitled to only one senator"). The criterion of contiguity has also been stretched
to the limit. See supra note 141.
146. Scholars have long recognized that equal population alone is a mechanically inadequate constraint
on gerrymandering, and that an overemphasis on that criterion is senseless and even counterproductive.
See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 5, at 278, 283 (emphasis on equal population has led to a "gerrymanderer's
paradise"); Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 252, 278 (principle
of equal population alone "may not be much more useful than one half of a pair of pliers"). Supreme Court
justices have had the same intuition. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578-79 ("Indiscriminate districting,
without any regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than
an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering."); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 555 (1968) (White,
J., dissenting) ("Today's decisions on the one hand require precise adherence to admittedly inexact census
figures, and on the other downgrade a restraint on a far greater potential threat to equality of representation,
the gerrymander. Legislatures intent on minimizing the representation of selected political or racial groups
are invited to ignore political boundaries and compact districts so long as they adhere to population equality.
147. This figure of speech is borrowed from David R. Mayhew, Congressional Representation: Theory
and Practice in Drawing Districts, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE SEvENTIES 249 (Nelson W. Polsby ed.
1971).
148. Although not absolutely impossible. See, e.g., Grofman, supra note 9, at 89-91 (Gerrymandering
"can be found in plans with wholly compact districts as well as in plans with many noncompact districts.").
See also ROBERT DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION AND REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS
459-461 (1968). Computers can endlessly crank out district plans which nevertheless conform to a fixed
standard of compactness. Even under a constraint of compactness, an infinite number of district plans are
still theoretically possible.
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An effective gerrymander, for purposes of our argument, is one that has
been designed to increase the disparity between a party's actual support among
the population and its seats in the legislature, and which actually achieves this
result. No one can say a priori the number of seats to which a party is entitled
given a particular level of popular support. A compactness standard need not
answer that question, which is a good reason why it can qualify as a neutral
standard which avoids nonjusticiable political questions. By purely mechanical
operation, a compactness requirement tends to inhibit gerrymandering. By
inhibiting gerrymandering, in turn, one abets proportional representation, not
by fiat, but by empirical tendency.149 A compactness requirement, in other
words, makes it superfluous for a court, or any other arbiter of fairness, to
aim at proportional representation directly. The objection that gerrymander
reform must eventually come down to judicially managed proportional repre-
sentation is thus sidestepped.
150
A requirement of compactness would prevent effective gerrymandering.
Consider again our hypothetical state with twenty congressional districts and
with a voting population divided 50-50 between two parties. With an equi-
numerosity and a contiguity rule but no compactness requirement, the party
controlling the districting could arrange wins in nineteen of those districts."'
The more compactness is enforced, 52 the greater the difficulty of arranging
wins in nineteen districts, and the greater the risk that the gerrymander will
fail or even backfire. At a certain level of compactness, even the most deter-
mined partisan with the fanciest software will be able to arrange majorities in
only eighteen districts.53 Tighten the compactness requirement further and
that number will drop to seventeen, and so on. If the only acceptable plan were
the most compact plan (according to whatever definition of compactness one
were using) results more like 10-10 or 11-9 would usually emerge.
149. Statistical aberrations remain possible. In addition we can imagine two particular kinds of
situations where inhibiting gerrymandering will harm proportional representation. First, under the Voting
Rights Act it is possible that a minority could attain proportional representation to a greater extent than
would ordinarily occur in single-member district elections. Second, a majority party may reach a bipartisan
districting accord with the minority party where the effect is to closely approximate proportional represen-
tation. See Gaffney v. Cummings 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (upholding such an arrangement); DIXON, supra
note 148, at 461; see also supra note 177 and accompanying text.
150. See Schuck, supra note 31, at 23; Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O'Connor
J., concurring).
151. See note 131 and accompanying text.
152. See infra part III.D for a discussion of the preferred standard of compactness.
153. At a certain level of compactness, arranging wins in 19 districts should become impossible in
all but the statistically rarest cases, regardless of the availability and accuracy of voter information or the
power of the computer. Put another way, beyond a certain level of compactness there probably will be no
mathematical solution which will create majorities in nineteen districts, even though there will still be an
infinite number of possible plans.
Yale Law & Policy Review
Several scholars have recognized the power of a compactness standard.t"'
A number of other commentators have argued that a compactness standard
would not have much prophylactic value, 15 and that, at most, a compactness
standard might be useful for identifying gerrymandering but probably would
not be useful in remedying it.'5" However, identifying gerrymandering can
allow one to remedy it. A judge who can ascertain if a given districting map
has been gerrymandered can enjoin its use, and the use of successor plans,
until a map is submitted that does not possess the stigmata of gerrymandering.
Sooner or later the mapmakers will have to produce an acceptable map.
C. Critiques of Compactness
Lowenstein and Steinberg have gone beyond simply doubting that the
compactness standard would do much good; they believe that it would actually
do much harm.' 7 According to them, compactness "is not neutral. On the
whole, the adoption of compactness as a criterion for drafting or evaluating
districting plans will systematically advance the interests of the Republican
Party and correspondingly disadvantage the Democratic Party. "158 The prof-
fered reason is that predictably die-hard Democratic partisans tend to be highly
concentrated in cities. Compact districts will tend to cluster these voters in a
few districts where many of their votes will be "wasted." The result will be
a sort of natural gerrymander favoring Republicans.159
In addition to the fact that Lowenstein and Steinberg have little evidence
that the Democrat-to-Republican ratio in heavily Democratic areas is consis-
tently higher than the Republican-to-Democrat ratio in heavily Republican
154. See RICHARD MORRILL, POLrrICAL REDISTRICTING AND GEOGRAPHIC THEORY 21 (1981)
("Except in isolated instances, it is quite difficult to gerrymander compactly. In most plans, the consistent
operation of a compactness criterion will have a random effect on political partisanship.").
155. Few would assert that the compactness standard would do literally nothing. See Grofman, supra
note 9, at 90-1.
156. Dixon wrote of the "myth of compactness," and disparaged "a rigid compactness rule," yet he
admitted that a "rule of compactness and contiguity, if used merely to force an explanation for odd-shaped
districts, can have much merit." DIXON, supra note 148, at 460-1. In the same vein Grofman stated that
"the usefulness of requiring that districts be compact has been vastly overrated," although he then conceded
"its usefulness as an indicia of possible gerrymandering," and included it as one of 12 such indicators.
Grofman, supra note 9, at 89, 118.
157. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 23.
158. Id.
159. The same argument was suggested in briefs opposing justiciability in Davis v. Bandemer. See
Brief of Appellants at 18, Davis, 478 U.S. 109 (No. 84-1244) ('A preference for compact and contiguous
districts is really nothing but a policy decision in favor of political groups whose support is evenly
distributed about a state."); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Assembly of the State of California Prior to
Consideration of Jurisdiction at 13, Davis, supra.
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areas,1 60 there is no reason to believe that "natural" gerrymanders are robust
and effective without a little help from partisan friends. As opponents of
gerrymander reform never tire of pointing out, even gerrymanders created with
all the skill that partisans can command are fragile and often risky. Targeted
voters are concentrated in a few districts in the hopes of winning many other
districts by modest margins. A miscalculation that leads to a loss in a marginal
district will saddle the clumsy, or unlucky, gerrymanderer with the worst of
all worlds. The gerrymanderer will have created opposition strongholds where
the votes of the mapmaker's own party will have been wasted on purpose,
while votes in marginal districts will have been wasted unintentionally. A few
unintentional marginal losses can eviscerate an entire gerrymander, because
to be effective, a gerrymander must produce wins, not just in a majority of
marginal districts, but in a supermajority of those districts.
Lowenstein and Steinberg evidently believe more than they say about the
resiliency of natural gerrymanders. Even if it is established that the two
parties' voter dispersion differs systematically from one place to another,
Lowenstein and Steinberg must show that Republicans will win a supermajority
of the marginal districts that a "natural" gerrymander creates. No published
study has demonstrated this effect and we know of no good reason to suppose
that it will occur.16 ' It seems equally likely that the Democrats will carry
enough marginal districts to spoil a natural gerrymander. A natural gerryman-
der may even redound to the Democratic Party's advantage where their core
districts were more irrefragably partisan than were the strongholds of the
opposition.
A more fundamental response to the Lowenstein-Steinberg claim that
compactness is merely "a Republican Trojan horse"' 62 is that it simply does
160. Grofman calls their data "sketchy to the point of nonexistence." Grofman, supra note 9, at 92
n.67. Indeed, their reliance on non-U.S. experience, together with their concession that their analysis of
the demographic picture is oversimplified, calls into question whether reliance on this proposition, which
is central to their argument, can be justified.
161. To date, we have not seen any proprietary studies. The difficulties of conducting this sort of
inquiry are formidable. Mere differences in voter dispersion, if shown, would not prove this effect.
Appropriate analysis must consider, by state, the number of voter districts, the size of the majority and
minority parties' support based on turnout, the minimum necessary difference in victory margins between
"packed" and "cracked" districts that will support a "natural" gerrymander (and this must account for the
expected natural inflation inherent in single-member districts), and some measure of the expected average
margin of victory in both the "packed" and "cracked" districts under a regime of compactness. The data
must also satisfy a ceterusparibus assumption, somehow discountng all the other factors which we know
influence elections-including the fact that current data on voting behavior may be skewed by the very
existence and operation of gerrymanders. Enough knotty statistical issues must be overcome that probably
the only way to settle this point is through empirical analysis-running thousands of computer models of
compact districts and seeing what happens. Someday, somebody may do this and if so, here is our bet.
First, except for cases of bipartisan gerrymanders, proportional representation will always be better served
in a compact world than in a gerrymandered one. Second, any loss of Democratic seats will be traceable
to the fact that Democrats do more gerrymandering. Third, there will be no discernible "natural" gerryman-
ders at all.
162. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 27.
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not matter, legally or ethically, that a fairness-enhancing reform will hurt one
party and help another. Such considerations received and deserved no weight
from the justices in Baker v. Carr. '63 Baker and its progeny have not been
defended or attacked because they established ground rules that help Democrats
or hurt Republicans (although a clear partisan effect was present).164 Critics
objected because the Constitution did not command "one person, one vote."
It was and still is a fair point, but at this late date that issue must be taken as
settled. Apart from that issue, it is simply a damnum absque injuria that fair
ground rules hurt people, including innocent people, who have profited in the
past from the existence and application of unfair rules.
If a compactness principle would systematically help Republicans at the
expense of Democrats, it would probably be because Democrats, controlling
many more state legislatures than Republicans, are in a position to do more
gerrymandering.' 65 If Democrats are harmed further because of differences
in how followers of the major parties are dispersed, it should not matter
legally. The destruction of gerrymandering is a worthy goal which will im-
prove the practice of democracy. As Martin Shapiro has pointed out:
Neither party chose to represent whom they did because of their geographic
stacking or dispersion or with an eye to how their choice would affect their
electoral fortunes if the world were suddenly to come ungerrymandered. If
geography favors the Republicans in an ungerrymandered world, that is a purely
fortuitous result, unforeseeable by either party when it chose its ideologies and
clienteles. Such stacking ought to be treated as extraneous to the goal of con-
straining the self-serving actions of legislatures.'"
163. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
164. See Shapiro, supra note 21, at 241.
By the time of Reynolds, the Democrats had enjoyed a majority position among voters for state
and national legislatures for thirty years. Nothing could have more clearly favored the Democratic
over the Republican party than a one-person-one-vote standard, which is, after all, the ultimate
majority-serving standard and was so intended.... Why did the one-person-one-vote standard
sustain its "heavy burden of persuasion?" Because it placed a major constraint on the inevitable
and otherwise incurable tendency of legislators to feather their own electoral nests. If compactness
or any other standard serves to constrain self-serving majority party and incumbent legislative
behavior, then it meets its burden of persuasion even if it incidentally provides Republicans with
even a little of the advantage that the one-person-one-vote standard gives Democrats.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Cain, supra note 32, at 216 ("Given the fact that the equal population
requirement is biased against the Republicans, how important is the consideration that compactness is
(possibly) biased against the Democrats?").
165. It is inconsistent for Lowenstein and Steinberg to fail to point this out as a basis for opposing
gerrymander reform. If there are no neutral ground rules for political discourse, it ought to be acceptable
for those who favor the Democratic Party to oppose gerrymander reform for the blunt reason that, because
Democrats get to do more gerrymandering, such a reform would hurt their party. Yet no one we know
makes that argument-in public, anyway. By contrast, Lowenstein and Steinberg's voter-dispersion
argument against compactness relies on the intuition that a natural gerrymander would be unfair because
the choice of where to live is an "innocent" one-that is, it is not motivated by partisan design. Lowenstein
and Steinberg thus tacitly acknowledge that there is such a thing as illegitimate partisan design.
166. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 240.
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It is an open secret that partisan fears about a constitutional compactness
criterion center on the fact that racial and ethnic minorities are concentrated
in big cities. That is where a compactness criterion would pinch hardest.
Generally, these minorities are disposed, and African-American populations
markedly disposed, to vote Democratic. 67 Democrats have a particular,
institutional stake in opposing the incorporation of the compactness criterion
into law, because they fear that this would concentrate Democratic voters more
than it would Republican voters.
Yet this issue is not only of concern to the Democratic Party. After all,
many minority voters define themselves first as a member of a minority group,
and only secondarily as a Democrat (or whatever other political party). The
minority voters' interests and those of the political party to which they adhere
are not in all respects and at all times congruent.
A single-member district system inflates the power of the majority party
in the legislature, by a factor which increases geometrically with the size of
the majority's public support. 16' The smaller a minority group, the more like-
ly that its members will be ineffectually scattered and the less likely that it will
form a majority in any one district. A small minority group may never have
a chance to send one of its own to the legislature, although it can become a
part of a coalition and thus influence whoever does get elected. The interest
of such a minority group may well be best served by having its members
concentrated in one or a small number of districts in order to create a comfort-
able majority in as many districts as possible. This intuition animates the
federal Voting Rights Act, 69 which, in outlawing the dilution of minority
voting strength, often mandates the deliberate concentration of minority voters
in particular voting districts.
Even if this concentration, combined with minority voting patterns, costs
the Democratic Party many "wasted votes," it would nevertheless remain true
that this aspect of the compactness criterion dovetails with one of the goals of
the Voting Rights Act. The primary antagonism, in other words, would not
be between the compactness criterion and the interests of the Democratic Party;
it would be between the interest of minority-group voters in electing a minority
member to office, and the interest of the Democratic Party in maximizing the
electoral success of Democratic candidates of whatever race. 170
There can be no a priori claim that minorities would necessarily be better
off being represented by Democrats of whatever race than by having the
167. See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 67, at 71-72.
168. See Grofinan, supra note 9, 52, at 55-56.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1975).
170. The divergence between Democratic and minority interests on the issue of redistricting already
has resulted in some surprising collaborations between minorities and the Republican Party. See Richard
L. Berke, Redistricting Brings About Odd Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 1991, at Al; The Battle of the
Pastry Cooks, ECONOMIST, May 18, 1991, at 27.
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realistic chance of being represented by one of their own race (regardless of
party). This question is one that minority groups are well able to answer for
themselves. Congress, in enacting the Voting Rights Act, apparently believed
that minorities would consistently prefer the chance to elect a minority repre-
sentative. 7'
Bruce Cain discredits the compactness criterion on a strictly non-partisan
basis. 72 Cain lists all the "good government" values that an ideal electoral
district would possess and then argues that these values are only uncertainly
related to a compactness standard. For example, the compactness criterion may
make it difficult to preserve "communities of interest," however these are
defined, and it may make it impossible to cleave to existing political bound-
aries. 73 Compactness may even conflict with the "good government" value
of proportional representation.' 74 Thus, Cain argues, there is no principled
reason to favor compactness.
There is, however, at least one principled reason that lies not in any
particular "good government" value but rather in the relationship between
district-making and democratic process. Apart from any independent value
compactness may have as a principle of democracy,'75 once one acknowledg-
es that gerrymandering is a pathology of democratic government, one needs
no better reason for embracing the compactness principle than that it makes
effective gerrymandering more difficult.
The primary purpose of gerrymander reform is to prevent vote dilution
carried out under the auspices of state government, and to redress the legal
wrong to those whose votes are deliberately wasted. Because gerrymandering
works by distorting the correlation of votes to seats, one advantage of gerry-
mander reform is a natural improvement in that correlation. Any increase in
proportional representation is, however, merely collateral to reform.176 By
171. See generally United Jewish Org. of Williamsburg v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1977).
172. CAIN, supra note 67, at 32-51.
173. Id. at 40. For example, "communities of interest" might refer to racial or ethnic minorities or,
in a flood control district, to riparian owners of property along a river.
174. Id. at 35-6.
175. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 756 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring). Our argument
stresses the prophylactic value of compactness in preventing gerrymandering over any other virtues it
possesses. Yet commentators, Cain most prominently, have too quickly dismissed the independent normative
value of compactness. See CAIN, supra note 67, at 34-51. The geographical organization of districts has
several things to recommend it. Most obviously, where one lives is a dominant fact in a person's life. (The
slang expression "gets you where you live" captures the essence of this idea.) Contemporary academic
writing undoubtedly has laid heavier stress on other aspects of life than geography, especially on race and
socioeconomic standing, to sort out generalizations about people, but where you live, the geography
statistic, gets you where you live as well. The strangers that impinge on one's life tend to live nearby rather
than far away, and the public concerns of virtually every local community tend first of all to things near
to home: property taxes, roads, public schools, police and fire service, snow removal, trash collection,
and so on. The idea that "all politics is local politics" deserves more than grudging recognition. It is, in
fact, the motivation behind having local district elections in the first place.




the same reasoning, it is a collateral injury where compactness worsens
proportional representation, as it does in a few cases.
The most likely case is one in which racial minorities have achieved a level
of representation under the Voting Rights Act beyond what their numbers
might warrant in ordinary single-member district elections. However, a race-
conscious electoral policy, assuming we are to have one, can be accommodated
to a legal compactness standard by the simple expedient of requiring that
noncompactness be explained by the mapmaker. If the explanation is that
noncompactness was forced by the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, this
should be legally sufficient."V
A second instance where compactness would impede the "good govern-
ment" value of proportional representation is the case of a bipartisan districting
accord, which might well lead to closer proportional representation for both
the minority and majority parties than unrigged elections would allow. The
Supreme Court upheld such a bipartisan plan in Connecticut in Gaffney v.
Cummings. 17" The wisdom of allowing such bipartisan gerrymanders is high-
ly suspect. The problem of self-constituting assemblies remains. We should
be skeptical of legislators' attempts to persuade us that when they design
district maps which make their own seats as safe as possible, they are motivat-
ed by an austere concern for the public weal. Even assuming, as we reluctantly
must after Gaffney, that such arrangements are permissible, it is possible to
accommodate them within the law simply by saying that the value of such
bipartisan arrangements justifies their noncompactness.
D. Choosing a Workable Compactness Standard
In this section we show that there is a conceptually adequate and practically
workable mathematical measure of compactness. Finding such a measure is
critical to meeting the requirement in Baker that there exist "judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards""7 with which to approach what might
otherwise be labeled a "political question." There are, in fact, a number of
ways of measuring compactness, described by a recondite literature.,5 0 One
of these, as we now show, is superior to the others, but it is not essential to
the argument for compactness that a particular criterion of compactness be
proposed and defended. As Shapiro notes, "[i]f the only reason to oppose
compactness is that there is no simple test for it as there is for equal popula-
177. The value of such a policy has been ably discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 67,
at 166.
178. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
179. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
180. For a compendium of proposed compactness measures, see Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,
756 n. 19 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens briefly and somewhat inaccurately characterizes
the Schwartzberg method that is proposed herein.
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tion, then we can easily overcome this obstacle by thinking in terms of con-
straints rather than ideals."181 Compactness that constrains gerrymandering
is compactness enough. Realistically, any one of a number of possible stan-
dards, if rigorously applied, could improve the current practice of districting.
Nor is it necessary to provide an a priori description of an ideal electoral
district. A proposal to defeat gerrymandering need not include such other
desiderata as preserving the seats of respected incumbents or the integrity of
"communities of interest." These and numerous other criteria have been
recommended as guidelines for legislative districting in the public interest."12
But it is not true that because many districting criteria are available, there is
no way to choose among them.8 3 There exists a world in which politicians
can remain free to weigh the merits and demerits of these many alternative
criteria, but in which, for all practical purposes, they cannot commit the excess
of gerrymandering. The burden of this section is to describe this world and
to show that a judge can get there from here."'
181. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 236-37.
182. For a good list of the "major proposed public interest criteria for legislative districting," see
Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 11; see also Grofinan, supra note 9; CAIN supra note 67, at
52-77 (discussing "good government" criteria). Our intent is to define a district in a way that does not
import into the definition other substantive criteria, for example, that it should be closely competitive
between parties, or that it should encompass a "community," or that the population should live near the
geographic center.
183. See, e.g., Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 42 at 11; Arend Lijphart, Comparative Perspec-
tives on Fair Representation: The Plurality-Majority Rule, Geographical Districting, and Alternative
Electoral Arrangements, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES, supra note 40, at 143, 145-47.
Grofman uncharitably suggests that these proliferations are so much argumentative rope-a-dope: "The
argument that there is no way to measure partisan gerrymandering provides a smokescreen behind which
gerrymandering can be hidden." Grofman, supra note 9, at 154.
184. Compactness is not the only antigerrymandering criterion that has been proposed. See, e.g.,
Niemi, supra note 139, at 195-201 (discussing the so-called "swing ratio," a sophisticated, incremental
measure of proportional representation). Furthermore, many of the indicia of gerrymandering mentioned
by Grofman, supra note 9, at 117-18 could probably be fashioned into formal restraints on gerrymandering.
Some commentators have suggested that strict adherence to existing political boundaries would prevent
at least the worst excesses of gerrymandering. This approach is a false trail. As a practical matter, the
constraining power of adhering to political boundaries is limited. Individual counties are often strangely
shaped and noncompact considered by themselves, and the forms that can be created by sets of contiguous
counties, even compact ones, can be made extremely noncompact. Further, the deviations which always
will be necessary to conform to "one person, one vote" will remain entirely unconstrained. At best,
adherence to political boundaries can serve as a rough approximation of a mathematical compactness
measure, preventing, perhaps, the worst cases of gerrymandering. There seems to be no good reason,
however, to settle for an approximation when infinitely more sensitive and discriminating compactness
measures are available.
As a normative matter, existing political boundaries are only weak elements of good districting
practice, and are routinely ignored whenever more important stakes are on the table. Many political
boundary lines, especially county lines, are practically of marginal importance to most people. While courts
have given these boundaries a certain amount of deference, especially in state legislative districting, see,
e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983), there is little reason to believe that the quality of statewide
or congressional representation would be enhanced by cleaving to them.
Ironically, political boundary lines are often the fossil record of old gerrymanders. In pre-colonial
days, the boundaries of districts were constantly adjusted in response to transient political needs. GRn=rrH,
supra note 11, at 25. There is no obvious reason to enshrine these ancient gerrymanders, save the Burkean
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Ideally, a compactness measure should have two qualities. First, it should
measure the right thing, the thing that gives it antigerrymandering power.
Second, it should be infinitely discriminating. It should gauge a range of
shapes across a spectrum, giving incrementally better scores to shapes which
are incrementally more compact. The best way to understand these character-
istics is by illustration. Suppose that, in calculating compactness, we divided
the longest straight line whose endpoints were within a district by the longest
line perpendicular to it whose endpoints were also in the district. A score of
1 is the lowest and best for any one district. (In figure 1, divide the length of
line A-B by the length of line X-Y.) This simple method will weed out many
long, thin districts which would be deemed noncompact by any reasonable
measure.
The problem with this method, however, is that it is not discriminating.
It is so insensitive, in fact, that one might question whether it measures the
right thing. A district shaped like a rectangle might score exactly the same as
one shaped like a cross. Both scores may be "perfect." If a rectangle and a
cross both have perfect scores, what (non-circular) argument would justify the
claim that they should not? It must be remembered that one need not possess
a platonic definition of "compactness." One only needs a kind of compactness
that frustrates gerrymandering.
This is why the perpendicular-line rule fails. It does not adequately discrim-
inate against partisan behavior. It cannot tell the difference between a district
plan constructed of tiled squares and one which is a jigsaw puzzle of irregular
shapes where the perpendicular maximums of individual districts happen to be
equal. But partisan mapmakers most assuredly can tell the difference. Such
people would much prefer the leeway to make T-shaped or L-shaped districts,
or shapes in between, as such leeway facilitates the business of including and
excluding voters. In other words, it facilitates gerrymandering.
Measures based on length-width displacements and the like are generally
inadequate because of their inability to discriminate. For example, one of
Iowa's statutory definitions of compactness measures the difference between
the line drawn from the northernmost point in a district to the southernmost
point and the line drawn from the point furthest east the one furthest west.'
Deviations that do not alter these four critical points have absolutely no effect
on the district's score. The Iowa measure is thus blind to any connivance that
occurs within the four "walls" to the north, south, east, and west, although
this may be very important to partisans. (See figure 2, in which each figure
has an identical, "perfect" score.)"8 6
185. IOWA CODE § 42.4(4)(b) (1981).
186. The Iowa measure also suffers from the odd defect that the same shape, when rotated slightly,
may yield a different score. As the simplest example, consider an equilateral triangle with sides of 10 miles.
Its base runs from east to west, and obviously measures 10 miles. Its north-south measurement will be the
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Morrill has a somewhat different measure, that compares the length of a
district's minimum diameter to the length of its maximum diameter. 8 7 As
long as the maximum and minimum diameters are held constant, the opportuni-
ty remains for partisans to manipulate district boundaries-unobjectionably,
insofar as Morrill's criterion is concerned. 188
There have been much more ambitious schemes for ascertaining compact-
ness.'89 Reock, for example, suggested that the area of a district be divided
by the area of the smallest circle which can circumscribe the district. 190 This
formula is relatively easy to use, incorporates a reasonable notion of compact-
ness, 19 1 and generally prefers shapes which a reasonable person would per-
ceive as compact. It is also infinitely sensitive in the sense that every change
in the perimeter, no matter how minute, will affect the score.
It is not, however, an infinitely discriminating measure, as figure 3 illus-
trates. Each shape is a square district, but with the same sized spike added to
capture a desired block of voters. For the simple reason that each of the spikes
is differently oriented, the Reock measurements are vastly different. (The area
of each district is the same, but the area of the circumscribing circles are not.)
However, there is no justification for these shapes possessing different scores.
In a state of ex ante uncertainty about the actual populations to be gerryman-
dered, the ability to create spikes is worth a certain constant amount to gerry-
manderers. In other words, to a gerrymanderer, the a priori expected value
of each shape is identical. Figure 4 yields an even more striking example of
a bad result, actually a perverse result. The protruding sinuosities make this
gerrymandered-looking shape nearer in area to the circle which circumscribes
it. Its score thus improves; figure 4 scores better than a square. This result is
height of the triangle, or about 8.7 miles. Yet if the triangle is rotated even slightly, then its northernmost
and southernmost points exist at two of the corners, at a distance of 10 miles; and at the same time its
easternmost and westernmost points are defined at two corners, again at a distance of 10 miles; as a result
its score is perfect.
187. MORRiLL, supra note 154, at 22. The term "diameter" undoubtedly means any line segment
whose endpoints bisect a district's perimeter. A definition of diameter that does not require literal bisection
means that any line segment can be rendered arbitrarily small.
188. There are an infinite number of districts having any specified ratio of X to Y between the
maximum and minimum diameters. Gerrymanderers will hate some of these possible districts and will love
others, but Morrill's measure would score them exactly equal. The measure is also capable of producing
anomalous results. Depending on a district's shape, it may be true that an irregular addition to a district's
perimeter will shift the endpoints of the diameters in such a way that the Morrill score will actually
increase.
189. One measure is based entirely on an analysis of a shape's "indentedness." Peter J. Taylor, A
New Shape Measure For Evaluating Electoral District Patterns, 67 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 947 (1973). It
gives perfect scores to all shapes which are convex. Id. at 948. Because the measure does not account for
elongation of a shape, a long, thin strip of land would score better than a square with one small indentation.
The standard also does not recognize curved lines, but must have them "converted" to straight lines before
calculating indentedness. Id. at 950.
190. Ernest C. Reock, Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative Apportionment, 5
MIDWEST J. POL. ScI. 70 (1961).
191. Above all this measure favors districts where the points at the perimeter are more or less
equidistant from a shape's center. The worst scoring shapes under this regime are long and thin.
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not "wrong" in terms of the essential quality which Reock's formula purports
to measure, which is a shape's ability to fill up a circle. It is, however, wrong
because it does not prevent gerrymandering.1 92
A related attempt to define compactness derives from the physical concept
of the "center of gravity" of an object. 193 This method ascertains the "mo-
ment of inertia," or axis of rotation, of a two-dimensional shape in the same
way a center of gravity is determined for a massive object. 94 Compactness
is the sum of the squared distances of every point in the shape in relation to
the moment of inertia. The "points" may be either geographic points or units
of population. t9' This method renders literal what Reock's measure only
approximates: compactness is the relation of every point in a shape to the
shape's center.
This benchmark has some anomalies of its own. First, it is far tougher on
larger districts than on smaller ones with identical shapes, because squares
increase exponentially as numbers get larger. The same proportionate "spike"
costs more in a larger than in a smaller district, because, for example, the
difference between nine-squared and ten-squared is only one one-hundredth
of the difference between 90-squared and 100-squared. As an embarrassing
consequence, the "center of gravity" score can give backwards results-a
large, compact district could score worse than a small, noncompact district.
There is a potential "fix" for this problem, namely renormalizing districts
by setting their areas equal to a fictional constant before calculating the center
of gravity. This esoteric procedure can be manipulated in its own right because
192. A measure proposed on two 1990 California ballot initiatives (both of which were defeated) seems
to have similar shortcomings. See Legislative Ethics Enforcement Initiative § 7(i)(6) (1990); Independent
Citizens Redistricting Initiative, art. IV A, § 6(b)(6). The measure, common to both, divides the population
subsumed within a district, by the population of the straight-edged polygon which circumscribes that district.
The former divided by the latter cannot fall below a certain percentage. In its technical aspects this measure
has the same "concavities" problem as does Reock's measure. A five-pointed star circumscribed by a
pentagon, for example, would allow ample leeway for a gerrymanderer to ply his trade in the concave
spaces between the spikes of the star. Further, if the majority of a district's population were centered in
one area, the remainder of the population could be acquired by tentacles which could range far and wide
across relatively unpopulated areas. One version of the initiative recognizes this problem, and specifies
that "[plopulous adjacent territory shall not be bypassed to reach distant populous areas." Independent
Citizens Redistricting Initiative, art. IV A, § 6(d)(4). There is, however, no accepted understanding of terms
like "bypass" and "populous adjacent territory."
The second problem with the measure is that it imports a substantive criterion into the definition of
compactness, favoring districts where the majority of the population lives near the center. Nothing in
principle is wrong with this feature, but this paper is meant to show that one can define compactness in
a way that prevents gerrymandering without pretending to know what "good" districts look like.
193. James B. Weaver & Sidney W. Hess, A Procedure for Non-partisan Districting: Development
of Computer Techniques, 73 YALE L.J. 288, 296 (1963); Henry F. Kaiser, An Objective Method for
Establishing Legislative Districts, 10 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 200 (1966).
194. This central point may also be conceptualized as the "average location" of a shape. It is thus
analogous to the statistical technique of determining the "least squares" line to describe graphic data. See
Weaver & Hess, supra note 193, at 296-97.
195. Iowa's second statutory measure of compactness combines both these concepts in an exotic
hybrid: "the ratio of the dispersion of population about the population center of the district to the dispersion
of population about the geographic center." See IOWA CODE § 42.4(4)(c) (1981).
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the unit one chooses for the constant can substantially influence the resulting
scores. Furthermore, like the Reock system, the center of gravity benchmark
would unjustifiably show different scores for the shapes in figure 3.96 Nev-
ertheless, another objection demands recognition. As the reader will already
have concluded, this procedure is just too complicated. Even without the fix,
it requires more mathematics than the average lawyer, certainly than the
authors, can command.
The center of gravity measure does have one prima facie redeeming
characteristic, and that is that the maximum score under this standard would
indicate an unimpeachably compact districting scheme. It is not enough,
however, for a compactness measure accurately to identify perfect-scoring
plans. A good measure of compactness must reliably distinguish among, and
order along, the spectrum of plans, from the very bad to the very good. This
capacity to discriminate continuously is important, because practically speaking
it is probably not possible to extirpate every last bit of partisan discretion to
draw district lines. Even under equal population standards a certain minimal
flexibility to depart from absolute equality has been allowed.'97 The ability
to make comparisons, not to identify states of perfection, is what a measure
has to be good at in order to be useful.
As a practical matter both the center of gravity standard and the Reock
standard would permit a great deal of gerrymandering. 9 ' The trick is to
make districts generally compact but replete with uncomely fractals at the
borders, shapes which, so long as they were properly oriented, would do little
to harm the district's score. This strategy could be extremely effective close
to population centers. Neither Reock nor the center of gravity standard can
measure what might be called the smoothness of a district's line. Both mea-
sures would register the silhouette of a circular saw blade as almost perfectly
compact. Those serrated edges, which could be quite useful to a gerrymand-
erer, would essentially be ignored. A straight-edged polygon, of much lesser
196. Aficionados will appreciate why this is so. The three figures would have only slightly different
centers of gravity, but the distance squared to the furthest-flung points would be dramatically different.
As with Reock's measure, the center of gravity standard is consistent within its terms. Our argument is
simply that these must be the wrong terms because they do not prevent gerrymandering. Note, however,
that in regard to the "independent" value of compactness (e.g. defining communities of interest, or making
travel in the district easier) the center of gravity standard is adequate.
197. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
198. In Acker v. Love, 496 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1972), the court propounded a measure whose advantages
and defects are similar to both the Reock and to the center of gravity standards. A compact district was
defined as "a geographic area whose boundaries are as nearly equidistant as possible from the geographic
center of the area being considered. .. " 496 P.2d at 76. (The standard arguably contravenes the one em-
bodied in the Colorado Constitution. See infra note 200.) The result is a reasonable test, although, like
the center of gravity test, it is insensitive to deviations that are oriented more or less perpendicular to the




a priori value to a gerrymanderer, might score no better than the blade under
either the Reock or the center-of-gravity measure.
For the purposes of defining legislative compactness, there are two superior
standards. The first may be called "minimum line length." The second is a
slightly modified version of a standard proposed by Schwartzberg. 199 A mini-
mum line length standard requires that the length of all district lines in a state,
when added together, be as short as possible. Unlike the other measures
considered so far, minimum line length is concerned solely with the compact-
ness properties of the set of districts in a state, not with the compactness of
any particular district within the set. It notices and measures exactly what
gerrymanderers are trying to do, namely, distort the lines of individual districts
in order to achieve a global result favorable to their client.2"e
While minimum line length would probably be a workable tool to combat
gerrymandering, it is subject to theoretical and practical objections. Minimum
line length focuses on a set of districts and does not pay attention to the
configuration of any individual district. The standard may result in districts
which are not particularly compact. Minimum line length is oblivious to
whatever good government values individual district compactness may serve.
Whether this is a grave problem depends on the outcome of the debate over
whether compactness possesses independent normative virtues. 21
There is a weightier and more practical objection to the minimum line
length standard. To the extent that any departure at all from the standard is
allowed-and inevitably there will be some leeway allowed-the standard is
relatively easy to subvert. If the minimum line length solution in a state is 1000
miles with a permissible deviation of five percent (50 miles),' the gerry-
199. Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Reapportionment, Gerrymanders, and the Notion of 'Compactness,
50 MINN. L. REV. 443 (1966).
200. Colorado's state constitution, one of two with a compactness provision, incorporates the minimum
line length standard. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47. Although this is one of the best of the compactness
measures, for unknown reasons Colorado's judges have chosen to ignore it in favor of the contrived
standard of Acker v. Love; see, e.g., In re Reapportionment of the Colorado Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d
209, 211 (Colo. 1982).
Michigan is the other state with a constitutional compactness provision. It requires, somewhat
impenetrably, that districts be "as rectangular in shape as possible" but does not further define the standard.
MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 2. See generally Grofman, supra note 9, at 84-86; 177-183.
Dixon has gone so far as to use the minimum line length criterion as a definition of compactness,
apparently without extended analysis. Robert Dixon, Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing
Legislative Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING IssuEs, supra note 40, at 16. Common
Cause has chosen the standard as its preferred method of enforcing district compactness. See Bruce Adams,
A Model State Reapportionment Process: The Continuing Quest for 'Fair and Effective Representation,'
14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 825, 874-75 (1977).
201. Compare Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 756 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("To some
extent, geographical compactness serves independent values; it facilitates political organization, electoral
campaigning, and constituent representation."), with CAIN, supra note 67, at 34, 50-51 (discussing intrinsic
value of compactness); see also infra note 175.
202. Common Cause suggests an allowable deviation of five percent. Common Cause, Toward a
System of "Fair and Effective Representation," (Washington, D.C. 1977) at 51.
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manderer will still be left with the discretion to draw fifty miles of grotesque,
non-compact district lines. Small non-compact districts, which will always be
in cities, would generally do little to unsettle a minimum line length score.
Indeed, as long as a single district in our hypothetical state had a perimeter
of less than 50 miles, a gerrymanderer could give it any shape he chose,
however tormented.
States with more districts would yield longer total minimum line length
solutions, and would thus yield more miles of leeway. More populous states,
which have more congressional districts, would give greater room for gerry-
mandering. These larger states are the ones in which both major parties are
strong and thus in which gerrymandering is apt to be an exceptionally impor-
tant factor in maintaining political control.
A different criterion of compactness is better than minimum line length and
indeed every other standard we have mentioned. This is the measure proposed
by Schwartzberg, which defines compactness in terms of the effectiveness of
a shape's perimeter in capturing area.2
Schwartzberg's measure deals with the ratio of a shape's perimeter to its
area. Not every ratio of perimeter-to-area, however, will adequately gauge the
compactness of that area, as the following illustration shows. Consider two
squares of different sizes, one with two-mile sides and one with ten-mile sides.
The smaller square has a perimeter of eight, an area of four, and therefore a
ratio of two. The larger square has a perimeter of forty and an area of 100,
or a ratio of 0.4. Both shapes, though identical, have very different scores.
Placing the perimeter-to-area ratio on an absolute scale will avoid this
anomaly. For any length of perimeter, whether ten centimeters or ten miles
long, a circle encloses the maximum possible area. Every other shape must
somewhere make a concession of some kind, so that perimeter will not be used
with the greatest possible efficiency to capture area. The absolute measure of
a shape's efficiency is determined by dividing the area of the shape by the area
203. Schwartzberg, supra note 199.
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of a circle with a perimeter of equal length.2"4 When this formula is applied,
all identical shapes, regardless of size, score the same. 2 5
The Schwartzberg criterion measures a gerrymanderer's self-indulgence
as surely as a breathalyser measures a drunkard's. Any deviation from any
given shape that changes a district's area and perimeter to the same extent, no
matter where the protrusion is added, which way it is oriented, how far it is
from the district's center, or how it is shaped, will degrade the district's
Schwartzberg score by an identical amount. The Schwartzberg measure
highlights the best features of the other criteria of compactness. It charges
points when districts are longer than they are wide; when boundaries are far
from the center; when lines are indented; or indeed whenever they are longer
than they have to be. The Schwartzberg test also measures "smoothness,"
taking away points for any irregularities in a boundary line, even in a generally
compact district. 2' The superiority of the Schwartzberg measure from the
204. The compactness of any shape can be obtained by using the following formula: (4 times pi,
multiplied by the district's area) divided by (the square of the length of the district's perimeter.)
This is not literally Schwartzberg's measurement, but a variant. Instead of using the ratio of areas,
he used perimeters. Thus the "relative compactness" of a shape "may be determined by finding the ratio
of its perimeter to the perimeter of a circle of equal area." Schwartzberg, supra note 199, at 444. Both
formulae really measure the same thing, and are mathematically translatable-the modification proposed
here yields a score that is always the inverse of the square of that yielded by Schwartzberg's method. But
our measure is easier to use and understand. It yields scores as a fraction between "zero" and "one," with
'one" being the highest. Schwartzberg's method yields scores on a scale from "one" to "infinity" (again
with "one" being the best). Hence, the significance of a Schwartzberg score may be comparatively difficult
to grasp. Our variant is close enough to the original that we refer to it throughout as Schwartzberg's
measure.
205. For example, squares, regardless of size, score .785. Comparing each shape to a circle with a
similar perimeter is mathematically equivalent to setting all perimeter lengths equal to the same number
of fictional units and then comparing areas. Grofman's preferred measure of compactness-perimeter
divided by the square root of the area-achieves the same standardizing effect. Grofman, supra note 9,
at 85-6 n.42.
206. Adopting the principle of Schwartzberg-compactness would present a minor problem of practical
administration, namely, what one does with jagged natural boundaries like rivers, coastlines, and so on.
It would make little sense in terms of inhibiting gerrymandering to penalize mapmakers for distorted
boundaries which they had no hand in making. The entire problem disappears if we adopt a simple
convention. Let mapmakers draw any fictional, "rounded" lines they want for the purpose of determining
the compactness score, provided that: (1) all land actually in a district must be contained within its rounded
boundaries; and (2) neither water, nor land which is not part of a district, may be included in the "area"
component of the Schwartzberg calculation.
These rules guarantee that any boundary lines drawn over water or other states will be as short as
possible. The most avid gerrymanderer would have no reason to elongate lines over water because this
would needlessly degrade the score by adding perimeter without adding area. Lines drawn according to
these two rules would always be straight, and move directly from each natural outcropping to the next.
So, for example, if all of eastern Texas were a single district, the Gulf Coast boundary would be compassed
by a single straight line from Port Isabel to Sabine Pass, well to the seaward of both Corpus Christi and
Galveston. Similarly, if all of southwest Texas were a single district, the "rounded" line would cross over
a good deal of Mexican territory.
The "rounded" boundary will hug a coastline or other irregular natural contour in the same way a
rubber band would if it were stretched over a scale model of that feature. The artificial line will describe
a shorter perimeter-the choice of scale will determine how much shorter-than the actual boundary would.
This will neutralize the effect of natural contours on the district's compactness score.
Situations may still arise where mapmakers are able to use natural borders to accomplish partisan
gerrymandering. The rounding convention will make it hard to identify these situations. These "natural"
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antigerrymandering point of view is simply that it assigns identical scores to
shapes that possess identical a priori value to gerrymanderers. Thus, each of
the shapes in figure 3, above, have (and ought to have) identical Schwartzberg
scores.
There is one sense in which the Schwartzberg measure apparently fails to
charge identical scores to deformed figures with identical a priori value to
gerrymanderers. If one of the districts in figure 3, had, rather than a "spike,"
an indentation of the same size, it would score worse under the Schwartzberg
standard. This is something of an anomaly because both shapes should have
an equal value to would-be gerrymanderers. The difference exists because
projections add to a figure's perimeter while adding to its area; but indentations
add to perimeter while subtracting from area.
Perhaps this kind of discrepancy is inevitable when one uses a compactness
measure that looks not at the set of districts but rather at each individual
district. However, gerrymanderers do operate globally, worrying about the set
of districts rather than one particular district at a time. They should value an
indentation and an outcropping identically because both can be used equally
to manipulate populations. Despite the theoretical objection to the Schwartzberg
criterion, it nevertheless works perfectly well in practice. The Schwartzberg
standard is so sensitive to any deviation that it is impossible to comfortably
gerrymander using either maneuver.2 7 Adding perimeter in a greater propor-
tion than area will always drop the score. In that sense there are no "wrong"
results: districts with appendages or indentations will always score worse than
those without.20"
One of the strengths of Schwartzberg-compactness is that it can be made
compatible with other public policy goals while still retaining its
anti-gerrymandering power. In other words, Schwartzberg-compactness
remains a meaningful concept even if it is overlaid on the decision to adhere
to existing political boundaries, 2" to create bipartisan gerrymanders,210 to
implement the goals of the Voting Rights Act,21' or to avoid diluting particu-
opportunities should be rare, however, and can be dealt with, if it is thought. necessary to do so, by the
adoption of some standardized unit of border measurement, as Schwartzberg himself suggested.
207. Think of a perfectly circular district, with a perimeter of 100 miles and an area of about 795
square miles. Its Schwartzberg score is perfect: 1.0. If a "spike" of two miles (one mile out and one mile
back) is added which does not add any appreciable area, the score is degraded to a .96. If a similar
four-mile spike is added, the score becomes a .92; and it drops to a .83 for a ten-mile addition (five miles
out and back).
208. Further, an outcropping from one district will typically (though not always) result in an
indentation in another, so the overall score will tend to be adequately penalized.
209. A constitutionally permissible goal of legislative districting; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
578 (1964).
210. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
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lar preferred communities of interest.212 Even if one of these objectives, even
if all of them at once, are given priority over compactness, the Schwartzberg
standard can nevertheless be used. The new "ideal" would simply become the
highest scoring plan which manages to embody these other goals as well.
District plans would never be held to a certain fixed standard, but rather would
be compared with one another.213 The best conceivable district plan in Mary-
land might have an average compactness score of no more than 0.20, owing
to that state's irregular shape. It should still be incumbent upon those who
draw the district lines to explain why their plan scores only a 0.10. If the goals
that a mapmaker claims to be pursuing can be met with a plan which is far
more compact, a suspicion of pretext is justified.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the heart of any serious thought about gerrymandering lies a black hole
in idea space. There is no generally accepted theory of representation that
would allow one to specify what a legislature needs to look like in order to
be worthy of its name. Democracy in this country has been vernacular,
pragmatic, traditional, and, in its detail, stunningly a-theoretical.214 We can-
not trace to a unified theory of democracy even formal macrostructures like
political parties or the committee system that organizes life in most legisla-
tures, let alone the diffuse network of customary and informal means that
influence the agendas that are set and the decisions that are made. The fine
details of our political culture seem to have more germinated like dandelions
than evolved as the cultivar of some set of organic axioms. Our democracy
is a tangle of traditions and habits ordered into a set of institutions that have
been accepted as the voice of the People.
These institutions, robust as they have been, are still vulnerable. Legisla-
tures are susceptible to manipulation through the districting process. Changing
only the lines on a map and not a single vote, the People's voice can be
dramatically altered. Those who draw those lines can become master ventrilo-
quists of the People's voice. To assert that this is a serious problem of democ-
212. Another constitutionally permissible goal of legislative districting, see, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109, 116, 176-77 (1986).
213. In this way the Schwartzberg measure avoids the general criticism of compactness found in
Niemi, supra note 139, at 190 ("[When boundaries have to be violated, there is presently no objective
way to measure the significance of alternative divisions . . . it is difficult to see how the Court can set
standards for compactness and for respecting political and community boundaries."). Also beside the point
is the observation that there is nothing "desirable per se about districts that look like squares or circles,"
or that it is "rare indeed to find regular geometric figures ... that can be aggregated into neat geometric
patterns," Grofinan, supra note 9, at 90, or that the circle is an improper ideal because it cannot be "tiled"
like a hexagon or square, Charles H. Backstrom, Problems of Inplementing Redistricting, in REPRESENTA-
TION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES, supra note 40, at 50. Neither shapes of a particular kind, nor "tiling"
is contemplated by the standard. (Variations in population density make tiling impossible in any case.)
214. See generally DAEL, supra note 25, at 145-151.
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racy, one need not claim that mapmakers often have grabbed illegitimate
power, although the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that they have done
so, and even more often have tried to do it. One need only believe that they
have the means, motive, and opportunity. Sophisticated observers understand,
of course, that the People and their voice are fictitious constructs, but they are
not meaningless; that other, older fictitious construct, the body politic, lives
by such myths. One may reasonably fear for its health if it had to do without
them.
We have shown how easy it is to exploit, under current practice, the rules
of legislative constitution in opportunistic ways. Admittedly, neither the theory
nor the practice of American democracy tells us what a single-member district-
ing plan ought to look like, or what the good is that a "good" plan would try
to capture. Fortunately, an empirical remedy like ours allows one to frustrate
gerrymandering without a clear picture of what rules of ideal districting such
manipulations transgress.
The theory of gerrymandering, though not the practice, has remained in
a fairly primitive state, but a few of the matters that lie in its shadow have
tolerably clear outlines. First, it is clear that what we mean by "legislature"
involves representation, itself a theoretically confounding term but one which
does have a widely shared substantive meaning. Second, part of that received
meaning implies proportional representation. "Proportional" in turn implies
a frame in which proportion can be observed, that is, a district. "Districts"
in turn imply places, contiguous parcels of real estate with equal populations.
What our analysis adds is the practical note that contiguity without compactness
is a lever without a fulcrum.
As central to American democracy as proportional representation is the
Madisonian characteristic of centering, rather than scattering, political debate.
The objective of centering, however, is potentially in conflict with that of
proportionality. Some of the most familiar prototypes of proportional represen-
tation scatter debate like giant political centrifuges.2"5 It is an arduous de-
mand to make of a political system that it simultaneously center political debate
and retain essential characteristics of proportional representation. The genius
of Madison's simple artifice is that a legislature elected by representational
districts both centers and, in gross, proportionally represents. The vulnerability
of this mechanism to manipulation remains one of the great unsolved practical
problems of American democracy. Indeed, it may be the best argument against
Madison's system.
215. Israel's Knesset, more a cultivar than a dandelion, is very rational in design, very defensible in
theory, very representative, very democratic, very proportional, and yet, in operation, a very cranky vessel
of democratic practice. See generally SAMUEL SAGER, THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF ISRAEL (1985).
See also GREGORY S. MAILER, THE KNESSET (1981). Mahler's diagram of the evolution of Israel's
political parties (Figure 2.1 at 40) makes graphic how fluid and dispersed Israel's political life has been.
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The Third Criterion
The equal population standard has helped to solve this problem by further
defining the notion of a district. The compactness criterion is the required next
step. It is beyond the scope of this essay, to say nothing of its authors, to say
whether a particular district ought to be compact or how compact it ought to
be. But we can answer an easier question: whether a compactness criterion
complicates the business of gerrymandering. It does. The third criterion will
make the gerrymanderer's life a living hell. That's why we're for it.
